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Beyond Law Enforcement: Camreta v.
Greene, Child Protection Investigations, and
the Need To Reform the Fourth Amendment
Special Needs Doctrine
Josh Gupta-Kagan*
The Fourth Amendment “special needs” doctrine distinguishes between searches and
seizures that serve the “normal need for law enforcement” and those that serve some other
special need, excusing non-law-enforcement searches and seizures from the warrant and
probable cause requirements. The United States Supreme Court has never justified drawing this
bright line exclusively around law enforcement searches and seizures but not around those that
threaten important noncriminal constitutional rights.
Child protection investigations illustrate the problem: millions of times each year, state
child protection authorities search families’ homes and seize children for interviews about
alleged maltreatment. Only a minority of these investigations involve suspected crimes, so most
fall on the special needs side of the line. This result undervalues the consequences of child
protection investigations on children (a severe infringement of their right to family integrity) and
on parents (the loss of their children and the stigma of a child abuse or neglect charge).
This Article proposes a new approach to the special needs doctrine: the doctrine should
distinguish between searches and seizures that implicate fundamental constitutional rights and
those that do not. It breaks new ground in identifying a theoretical value to such a bright line: it
gives governments less incentive to interfere with liberty by seeking alternative means to
achieve their goals. To realize this value most effectively, the line must be drawn to value all
fundamental constitutional rights, not only those connected to the criminal justice system. In
child protection, it would push states to choose less-liberty-infringing models of providing
assistance to vulnerable families, which the empirical record shows would serve children and the
child protection system’s goals more effectively.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Nimrod Greene is arrested for allegedly molesting a boy
unrelated to him. The boy’s mother reports that Greene’s wife “had
talked to her about how she doesn’t like the way [Greene] makes [their
nine-year-old daughter] sleep in his bed when he is intoxicated, and
she doesn’t like the way he acts when she is sitting on his lap.”1 A
child protection investigator goes to the nine-year-old child’s school,
1.
See Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated in part, 131
S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2012]

BEYOND LAW ENFORCEMENT

355

takes her out of class, brings her to a private room, and closes the door.
The girl denies that Greene abused her and signals that she does not
want to talk further. But the investigator does not accept her denials
and repeatedly asks about abuse. After two hours, she says that her
father did abuse her. The investigator removes her from her parents’
custody and places her in foster care. She recants the allegation. State
officials have a doctor examine her; no evidence of sexual abuse is
found. Three weeks later, lacking evidence to prove abuse, the state
sends her home and closes the case.2
Under the prevailing Fourth Amendment “special needs”
doctrine, the seizure of the child in the above scenario is likely
constitutional. The doctrine provides that searches and seizures
serving states’ “normal need for law enforcement” require a warrant
and probable cause, while searches and seizures serving “special needs
beyond . . . law enforcement” do not.3 The doctrine offers no means
“to discriminate among distinct sorts of non-law-enforcement
objectives,”4 so the importance of the noncriminal constitutional rights
implicated by the searches and seizures are of no import. With no law
enforcement purpose, no warrant or probable cause would be required.
Although the searches and seizures involved could still be tested for
reasonableness, their qualification as a special need is almost certainly
outcome-determinative.
Following this analysis, millions of
investigative steps like the fact pattern above (seizures of children and
parents for nonconsensual interviews, searches of families’ homes, and
inspections of children’s bodies) occur each year.5
This Article argues that the special needs doctrine should draw a
line between searches and seizures that threaten fundamental
constitutional rights beyond the searches and seizures themselves, and

2.
This fact pattern resembles that in Greene v. Camreta, which is discussed in Part
II.A, with one difference: in Greene, a deputy sheriff joined the social worker in the
interview and investigated the alleged sex abuse for possible criminal charges. Greene, 588
F.3d at 1016-20.
3.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
4.
Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding
Public, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 87, 89. Schulhofer argues that the law enforcement versus other
purposes distinction is “chimerical and irrelevant.” Id. He proposes replacing that distinction
with one between government activity to achieve some kind of “social control” and searches
and seizures “in aid of the internal governance objectives of public enterprises.” Id. at 118. I
discuss that proposal infra note 252 and accompanying text.
5.
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD
MALTREATMENT 2010, at 20, 22 (2011), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/
pubs/cm10/cm10.pdf.
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those that do not.6 By focusing only on the presence or absence of law
enforcement purposes, the present doctrine ignores the searches’ and
seizures’ infringements on children’s and parents’ privacy rights and
the severe consequences (infringement on the fundamental substantive
due process right to family integrity) that flow from these searches and
seizures. The doctrine also ignores a basic purpose of Fourth
Amendment law: to distinguish between searches and seizures that
require a warrant and probable cause to check executive branch
discretion and those that do not. When a search or seizure threatens
fundamental constitutional rights and involves significant executive
discretion, a warrant and probable cause should be required.
Child protection searches and seizures illustrate the problematic
analysis and results created by the present special needs doctrine.
Unlike special needs searches implicating public employment or other
consequences beyond fundamental constitutional rights, child
protection investigations implicate the Fourteenth Amendment family
integrity rights of millions of children and parents every year. Child
protection investigations have given rise to two United States Supreme
Court special needs cases, including Camreta v. Greene, on which the
above fact pattern is based, and which was decided in 2011 on
jurisdictional, not Fourth Amendment, grounds.7 Unlike the fact
pattern above, Camreta involved a joint investigation between a deputy
sheriff and a child protection worker, both of whom were present in the
interview. The case centered on whether the deputy sheriff’s
involvement placed the seizure on the normal need for law
enforcement side of the special needs line.8 The special needs doctrine
mandated this focus, but it ignores the profound questions that arise
independent of any law enforcement involvement. Because the only
potential criminal consequences in Camreta were faced by the
suspected father, the doctrine’s law enforcement focus ignored the
consequences to the child, who was separated from her family and
placed in state custody, infringing upon one of the most fundamental
6.
By “fundamental constitutional rights,” I mean those rights that have been held to
apply to the states because they are “the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty” or that
have been held to be fundamental constitutional rights through some other source, most likely
the Fourteenth Amendment. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); see infra text
accompanying note 255.
7.
Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011); see Ferguson v. City of Charleston
(Ferguson II ) , 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
8.
Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Nat’l Treasury
Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)),
vacated in part, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
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liberty interests enjoyed by anyone, especially children. The doctrine
ignored the invasiveness of the seizure itself, the consequences for the
constitutional right of family integrity, and the level of discretion
involved in performing the seizure. And when there is no law
enforcement involvement (as occurs millions of times every year), the
doctrine permits significant invasions of children’s and families’
privacy at home and elsewhere, implicating fundamental constitutional
rights without consideration of the severity or credibility of
allegations.9 In the majority of cases, affecting millions of families,
child protection investigations infringe on liberty and threaten family
integrity without giving children or families any benefit in return.10
Moreover, the doctrine ignores a troubling aspect of many child
protection investigations: poorly performed interviews of children,
such as the interview in Camreta, which are inadequately regulated by
state agencies. When abuse or neglect has not occurred, these
interviews may create false allegations that lead to unnecessary state
intervention in families. When abuse or neglect has occurred, they
create evidentiary problems when states appropriately seek to
intervene in families.
The special needs case law offers no explanation of why law
enforcement purposes make searches and seizures so different from all
other searches and thus no adequate justification for the doctrine’s
handling of child protection cases. This doctrine, first coined in 1985
in New Jersey v. T.L.O., is now the basis of multiple Supreme Court
holdings and lower court litigation. But in the intervening quartercentury, the Supreme Court has not explained what makes searches
and seizures with law enforcement purposes different, why searches
that affect fundamental but noncriminal constitutional rights ought not
be treated the same as those that do not affect constitutional rights, or
how a line defined by law enforcement needs differentiates searches
and seizures that need a warrant and probable cause from those that do
not.
Despite its flaws, the special needs doctrine distinguishes
searches and seizures that threaten important rights and are thus more
invasive from those that do not. This Article breaks new ground by
identifying the value of drawing a bright line between searches and
seizures implicating some fundamental rights and those that do not.
Such a bright line values constitutional liberties by creating incentives
9.
10.

See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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for policy makers to avoid more invasive forms of state intervention;
by choosing a policy option that infringes on liberty less, governments
can ensure the administrative state can do its work without the burdens
and limitations that come with a warrant and probable cause
requirement. By focusing on the administrative state’s workings, the
doctrine can also push the government to develop clear administrative
procedures that adequately substitute for a warrant procedure. The
doctrine should be reformed to account for searches and seizures
conducted with the purpose of implicating significant noncriminal
constitutional rights and for the level of executive branch discretion.
This Article connects child protection investigations and the
special needs doctrine that governs them, both of which independently
have received critical, academic focus. This Article builds off of that
recent work, while offering new analysis of both child protection cases
and the special needs doctrine. Doriane Lambelet Coleman has made
a powerful normative argument against excepting child protection
searches and seizures from warrant and probable cause requirements:
the invasiveness of these searches, measured against the strength of
privacy and liberty interests at stake, requires traditional Fourth
Amendment protections.11 Her normative case needs no repetition
here. Her doctrinal argument, however, depends on the special needs
doctrine in its present form and concludes that the entanglement
between law enforcement and civil child protection authorities in these
searches renders the special needs doctrine inapplicable.12 This
conclusion overstates the extent of law enforcement entanglement.
Many, perhaps most, child protection searches and seizures do not
involve law enforcement and do not threaten or result in law
enforcement consequences. Absent such law enforcement entanglement, the currently prevailing special needs test will apply to most
such searches and seizures and would likely approve of the warrantless
searches and seizures that Coleman has argued so powerfully against.
Considered from her perspective, then, the special needs doctrine
needs reevaluation.
The academy has criticized the special needs doctrine, including
the law enforcement purpose threshold, for its “doctrinal
incoherence”13 and for being “notoriously unclear,”14 but the academy
11. Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle To Save the Children: The
Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 413, 539-40 (2005).
12. Id. at 425-26.
13. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 89.
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has spent little time considering how the doctrine’s bright line, which
has existed for multiple decades and remains strong, could be tied
more meaningfully to the rights implicated by specific searches and
seizures. An early and oft-cited work called for replacing the “law
enforcement versus other purposes” distinction with a distinction
between searches and seizures serving “inter[n]al gover[n]ance
imperatives of a self-contained public activity” and searches and
seizures serving “external social control,”15 an approach which only
indirectly considers the constitutional rights at stake and less
effectively incentivizes government to choose less-liberty-infringing
policy options.
This Article will proceed as follows: Part II will explore child
protection searches, both in Camreta and more broadly, arguing that
the special needs doctrine has failed to shape sound decisions in those
areas. Part II will also summarize research showing that children
subject to child protection investigations are not helped by the status
quo and argue that a less-liberty-infringing response can more
effectively help the children and families, who are the subjects of child
abuse and neglect allegations.
Part III will explore the special needs doctrine’s origins,
boundaries, and development, and, in so doing, it will reveal the
doctrine’s unjustified assumptions about law enforcement searches and
failure to analyze when a warrant and probable cause are required,
which are problems that lead directly to the doctrine’s mishandling of
child protection cases. In tracing the doctrine from its historical
origins to the present day, Part III will also identify its focus not only
on searches and seizures themselves but also on their consequences to
individuals searched and seized.
Part IV will develop the important values contained in the special
needs doctrine but never coherently theorized, especially its ability to
push governments to invade liberty less and to develop legislative and
regulatory regimes that check official discretion when such invasions
occur. It will then explain how the Supreme Court should strip away
the arbitrary distinction between law enforcement and other purposes
and reform the doctrine to ask, instead, whether searches and seizures
implicate fundamental rights and whether administrative procedures
are adequate to replace a judicial warrant procedure. Applying this
reformed test to child protection investigations, Part IV will illustrate
14. Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L.
REV. 254, 257 (2011); see also id. at 257-58 (summarizing past criticism).
15. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 89, 118.
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how these reforms will lead to results that are more just, more
coherent, and more consistent with a principled approach to the special
needs doctrine.
II.

CAMRETA V. GREENE AND CHILD PROTECTION SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES: ILLUSTRATING THE PROBLEM WITH THE CURRENT
SPECIAL NEEDS TEST

The Fourth Amendment issues raised by child protection searches
and seizures illustrate the problems that come from the special needs
doctrine’s bright line between law enforcement searches and all other
searches. I focus on child protection searches and seizures for four
reasons.
First, these searches and seizures effectively illustrate the special
needs problem because they implicate the fundamental but
noncriminal constitutional right of family integrity, “perhaps the oldest
of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e Supreme]
Court.”16 Relatedly, the various fact patterns of child protection cases
have presented hard special needs questions to the Supreme Court.
Two different child protection cases, Camreta and Ferguson v. City of
Charleston (Ferguson II ),17 have already done so. Given the lack of
resolution to the Fourth Amendment issue in Camreta, a case which
the Court dismissed for mootness,18 a future child protection case is
likely to shape special needs doctrine.19
Second, analyzing child protection searches adds to our academic
understanding of the special needs doctrine. Courts and academics
have traditionally addressed all “administrative search” cases under
16. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
17. 532 U.S. 67 (2001); see discussion infra Part III.C.
18. 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2026 (2011).
19. There are other possible scenarios. State action to commit individuals
involuntarily to mental institutions requires clear and convincing evidence that the individual
is mentally ill and must be institutionalized to protect the individual or others. Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). Evidence might include the individual’s statements, medical
records, and articles at their home, e.g., id. at 421, and might be gathered by entering an
individual’s home or seizing the individual for a mental health evaluation, Gooden v. Howard
County, 954 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (involving an entry into a private home,
justified by reasonably perceived exigent circumstances). Civil schemes regulate individuals’
right to own firearms—now recognized as a fundamental constitutional right and applied
against states, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010)—and some include
provisions for seizing such guns, e.g., D.C. CODE § 7-2502.10 (2012) (establishing an administrative procedure for revoking a certificate permitting gun ownership and compelling
surrender of a weapon without mentioning a warrant or probable cause). If such procedures
are valid, it is because the Second Amendment permits significant regulation, not because of
the civil versus criminal distinction.
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one heading, ignoring important differences between categories of
cases. Others in the academy have contributed to “disentangling”
different types of cases, and thus analyzing each category more
coherently.20 For example, Eve Brensike Primus identifies two
categories: “dragnet” cases, such as police roadblock or health
inspection cases, and “special subpopulation search” cases, relating to
individuals with reduced expectations of privacy.21 Child protection
searches do not fall neatly into either category and thus raise unique
questions about the doctrine. They are not dragnet searches because
all individuals are not stopped equally; child protection investigations
only follow individualized allegations of child abuse or neglect.22 Nor
do these investigations involve individuals with reduced expectations
of privacy; children or parents who are searched or seized at their
homes (as is common in child protection investigations) have no
reduced privacy expectations. Arguably, children at school have
reduced expectations of privacy (though this point was contested in
Camreta,23 the better view is that children do not have an across-theboard reduction in their privacy interests at school and the proper
analysis is context-specific24), but that only addresses a slice of child
protection investigations.
Third, child protection searches and seizures represent a
widespread and important issue in their own right and affect millions
of children (and millions more adults) every year.25 Moreover, the
scope of these searches and seizures illustrates important policy
incentives that may result from reforming the doctrine. Child
protection agencies receive nearly 1.6 million reports of alleged child
abuse or neglect each year,26 regarding nearly three million children.27
20. Primus, supra note 14, at 260. Christopher Slobogin has agreed that scholars
have “tended to lump all of these decisions together,” even if Eve Brensike Primus makes an
“overstated” case. Christopher Slobogin, The Implications of Disentanglement, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. SIDEBAR 103, 104 (2011).
21. Primus, supra note 14, at 260.
22. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
23. Infra note 83 and accompanying text.
24. Kristin Henning, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Children at Home: When
Parental Authority Goes Too Far, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 55, 68-69 (2011).
25. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
26. The federal government counted 1,581,882 reports. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra
note 5, at 11. This figure excludes child protection hotline calls which did not report alleged
abuse or neglect. This figure only includes data from forty-five states; extrapolated to
include all states and territories, there were more than 2 million reports. See id. at 5 (listing
3.3 million reports, multiplied by the “screened in” rate of 60.7%).
27. The federal government counted 2,987,515 children. Id. at 32. This only
includes the “[c]hildren [w]ho [r]eceived a [r]esponse” from child protective services (CPS),
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Those large numbers should be understood in the context of what
happens in the resulting investigation. The majority of investigations,
more than 80%, are closed without an administrative finding of abuse
or neglect.28 Perhaps even more of these investigations should close
without findings of abuse or neglect. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has described administrative findings
of abuse or neglect as “at best imperfect,” noting that three-quarters of
administrative challenges succeed in reversing such findings.29
Frequently, these challenges occur only when the administrative
findings lead a parent to lose a job,30 suggesting that many parents with
legitimate claims do not challenge these administrative findings.
Moreover, a long backlog of administrative challenges can occur in
some jurisdictions.31 (Of course, there may also be cases closed
without a finding of abuse or neglect, in which such a finding would
be justified.) Child protection agencies substantiate abuse or neglect
in the remaining 20% of reports, affecting about 695,000 children.32
Neglect is the type of maltreatment found by child protection agencies
in the majority of cases; physical or sexual abuse accounts for no more
than 26.8% of cases.33
Each of the three million children who are subject to these
investigations has at least one parent or caretaker. Many have one or
more siblings, and many share homes with people beyond their nuclear
families. The total scope of child protection investigations is thus quite
id., meaning it excludes children subject to referrals “screened out” by CPS agencies, see id.
at 5 (discussing screening procedures). Including children who were the subjects of multiple
hotline calls and multiple CPS responses, the government counted 3,604,100 children—
showing that a significant number of affected children face multiple CPS investigations each
year. This is referred to as the “[d]uplicate count.” Id. at 32.
28. Id. at 20.
29. Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1003-04 (2d Cir. 1994).
30. Id.
31. See John O’Brien, NY Denied Thousands Accused of Child Abuse the Chance To
Clear Their Name, SYRACUSE POST-STANDARD (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.syracuse.com/
news/index.ssf/2010/03/ny_denied_thousands_accused_of.html (describing long delays that
led state officials to shred administrative requests). Further details are available on the Web
site for a related class lawsuit. See Law Offices of Thomas Hoffman, N.Y. ST. WIDE CENT.
REGISTRY CHILD ABUSE & MALTREATMENT CLASS ACTION WEBSITE, http://www.registryclass
action.com (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
32. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 5, at 20, 22.
33. Id. at 24. The number may be lower than 26.8% because that figure doublecounts children found to have been both physically and sexually abused. The federal data
does not separately report the proportion of child protection hotline reports of neglect (as
compared with abuse). One study that used small samples of hotline calls suggests that the
majority of hotline reports are also of neglect. JANE WALDFOGEL, THE FUTURE OF CHILD
PROTECTION: HOW TO BREAK THE CYCLE OF ABUSE AND NEGLECT 14 (1998).
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large: several million—perhaps as many as ten million—children and
adults are subject to searches and seizures at home, school, and
elsewhere every year. Following their own protocols, child protection
agencies insist on inspecting homes and interviewing children, parents,
and other caregivers in each investigation.34 After investigations that
touch all of these individuals, the number of children that child
protection agencies remove from their families is fairly small: about
254,000 children, or 8.5% of the 3 million children subject to these
investigations.35
Examining the data has led some child welfare experts to argue
that child protection agencies do not need to investigate several million
children in order to protect a quarter million by removing them from
parental custody. These commentators argue that the current rate of
investigation requires child protection agencies to spend too much time
investigating cases unlikely to lead to removal, either because the
allegations are not credible or because the allegations are not
sufficiently severe—unnecessarily intervening in many families and
draining limited resources from cases that need greater attention.36
Connecticut’s reformist child welfare director estimated that 40% of all
investigations could be diverted to a less adversarial approach.37 More
traditional Fourth Amendment protections would create incentives for
states to triage child protection hotline calls more effectively and thus
reduce the scope of privacy invasions that these investigations entail.
Relatedly, some evidence exists that by not investigating families
at lower risk of maltreatment, child protection authorities can better
protect children in more-serious cases, and therefore create incentives
to limit the number of child protection searches and seizures that could
also serve the government’s interest in protecting children. A study of
Missouri’s “differential response” pilot (through which state officials
only investigated more-severe allegations and diverted less-severe
reports) concluded that by reducing the number of less-serious
investigations, authorities had more time to investigate sexual abuse
34. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
35. The federal government counted 254,375 children who entered foster care in
fiscal year 2010. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE
AFCARS REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2010 ESTIMATES AS OF JUNE 2011, at 3 (2011), available
at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport18.pdf.
36. E.g., WALDFOGEL, supra note 33, at 19 (describing a study in which over 60% of
cases reported to CPS were unsubstantiated).
37. Jacqueline Rabe Thomas, DCF Head Gets the Authority She Sought To Fix
Troubled Agency, CT MIRROR (June 10, 2011), http://www.ctmirror.org/story/12907/dcfwrap.
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cases. Those investigations were more comprehensive and allowed
police to gather enough evidence to arrest more perpetrators of sexual
abuse, preventing them from preying on more children.38
Fourth, these searches and seizures have occurred frequently and
for many years without definitive rulings on their constitutionality or
much attention from the academy.39 Camreta is one of a relatively
small set of cases challenging Child Protective Services’ (CPS’)
investigatory tactics. As a result, Fourth Amendment concepts appear
to be largely foreign to the day-to-day operations of child protection
investigations. A 225-page manual guiding District of Columbia
investigations, for instance, does not mention the Fourth Amendment
and does not refer to “probable cause,” “warrant,” or “reasonable
suspicion” as limits to investigators’ authority.40 Coleman has taken a
crucial step toward addressing the Fourth Amendment status of child
protection searches, making a compelling normative argument for
applying traditional Fourth Amendment standards (probable cause and
warrant requirements) to child protection searches and seizures.41 But
Coleman frames her argument in connection to her conclusion that the
special needs doctrine should not apply to such searches; she argues
against applying some other “child welfare exception” to the warrant
and probable cause requirements for such searches. I am not so
sanguine as to suggest that the current special needs doctrine would
not apply to child protection searches;42 at the very least, many cases
will present less child protection and law enforcement entanglement
than Camreta did, making Coleman’s normative argument more
difficult doctrinally.

38. L. ANTHONY LOMAN, INST. OF APPLIED RESEARCH, DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE
IMPROVES TRADITIONAL INVESTIGATIONS: CRIMINAL ARRESTS FOR SEVERE PHYSICAL AND
SEXUAL ABUSE (2005), http://www.iarstl.org/papers/DiffRespAndInvestigations.pdf.
39. Coleman’s article is the clear exception to this lack of attention, and Coleman
began her article by noting the “dearth of scholarly attention” to the subject. Coleman, supra
note 11, at 423.
40. D.C. CHILD & FAMILY SERVS. AGENCY, CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVS. ADMIN.,
INVESTIGATIONS: PROCEDURAL OPERATIONAL MANUAL (2011), http://cfsa.dc.gov/DC/CFSA/
Publication Files/CFSA PDF Files/About CFSA/Publications/POMS/Investigations-POM.pdf.
The manual refers to probable cause as the standard by which the Superior Court of D.C.’s
Family Court Operations Division will judge whether allegations of abuse or neglect are true
and thus whether a child may be removed, id. at 58, but the standard is not used in connection
to the child protection investigation itself. Similarly, the manual refers to search warrants
executed by police that lead to evidence of child abuse or neglect, id. at 96, but not as
something that limit child protection investigations.
41. Coleman, supra note 11, at 508-38.
42. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
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This Part will first explain Camreta’s facts, then the themes it
illustrates in child protection searches and seizures beyond those facts.
It will then explore how the case’s litigation illustrates the core
problems with the current version of the special needs doctrine, and
why reforming that doctrine is required to provide coherent guidance
in child protection investigations.

A. Camreta v. Greene: Facts
An Oregon Department of Human Services caseworker, Bob
Camreta, and Deschutes County deputy sheriff, James Alford, received
allegations that Nimrod Greene had molested his daughters, S.G. and
K.G.43 The allegations triggered a civil child protection investigation
by Camreta and a criminal investigation by Alford. Greene was
arrested for sexually abusing an unrelated seven-year-old boy who had
told police that Greene had touched the boy’s penis over his pants
twice during a visit to the boy’s home while drunk. The boy’s mother
told the police that Greene’s wife, Sarah Greene, said, “[S]he doesn’t
like the way [he] makes [S.G. and K.G.] sleep in his bed when he is
intoxicated” and that Sarah Greene had made other comments
expressing similar concern regarding Greene’s behavior toward his
daughters while drunk.44
About one week later, Greene was released from jail. Camreta
learned of his release and of his resulting unsupervised contact with
S.G. and K.G. Three days passed without action or investigation.
Camreta and Alford then went to the school of S.G., who, at the age of
nine years, was the older sibling. Camreta intentionally chose not to
seek the consent of either of S.G.’s parents and to interview S.G. at
school so that she would be “away from the potential influence of
suspects, including parents.”45 Camreta did not seek a warrant or any
court order before the interview.
At Camreta’s request, a school counselor took S.G. from her
classroom to a private room at the school where she was left alone
with Camreta and Alford. S.G. felt “scared.” Camreta and Alford kept
her alone in the room for two hours while they interviewed her.46
43. The children are identified only by initials in all public court documents.
44. Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Nat’l Treasury
Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)),
vacated in part, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
45. Id.
46. These facts reflect S.G.’s account. Some facts were disputed—for instance,
Camreta and Alford claimed the interview lasted about one hour, not two. But the case was
litigated and decided on the defendants’ summary judgment motion and subsequent appeals,
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Alford had his firearm visible and did not ask questions during the
interview. Camreta took the lead, first asking S.G. if her father
touched her. S.G. responded in the affirmative, but emphasized that
these were good touches: hugs, kisses, “piggy-back rides, rides on his
shoulders and horsey rides.”47 Camreta did not accept that answer, and
kept asking S.G. if her father touched her “in a bad way.” The
questions repeated until, in S.G.’s words, “I just started saying yes to
whatever he said.”48
Ironically, the facts most relevant to the litigation about this
interview—Alford’s presence and the criminal investigation—had little
relevance to S.G.’s understanding of the case. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit offered this summary of S.G.’s
deposition: “With respect to Alford’s presence, S.G. stated that she is
generally comfortable around police officers, that Alford was nice to
her and did not do anything to scare her, and that she trusted him.”49
Her brief to the Supreme Court emphasized that she was “scared”
when a school counselor left her alone with two men she did not know,
and that she decided to falsely report sexual abuse because she wanted
“just to get out of the room” and feared that her school bus would
leave without her, not because of any extra coercion created by
Alford’s presence or behavior.50 The coercive interrogation and its
potential consequences, not Alford’s presence or involvement, left S.G.
“so upset . . . that she vomited five times that night after returning
home.”51
After the interview, both criminal and civil child protection
authorities believed they had sufficient evidence to act.52 A grand jury
indicted Greene for felony sexual assault of S.G. and the unrelated boy.
A court ordered Greene to have no contact with S.G. or K.G. Camreta
discussed the no contact order with Sarah Greene, and he left
convinced that she believed Greene was not abusive and that she
would not protect her children from future abuse (an assertion Sarah

so, like the courts deciding the cases, this Article takes the facts “in the light most favorable
to” S.G. Id. at 1017 & n.1.
47. Id. at 1017.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Brief for Respondents at 2, 4, Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (Nos.
09-1454 and 09-1478) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/previewbriefs/09_1454_Brief_Updates/09-1454_Respondent
Brief.authcheckdam.pdf.
51. Id. at 4.
52. Greene, 588 F.3d at 1018.
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Greene denied).53 Camreta then filed a petition in the local juvenile
court asking for protective custody of S.G. and K.G. The court issued
the order and the government removed S.G. and K.G. from their
parents and placed them in foster care.54
S.G. and K.G. remained in state custody for twenty days. During
that time, the state sent them both to the Kids Intervention and
Diagnostic Service Center for interviews and physical exams. S.G.
told interviewers that her father had not abused her and that her
statements to the contrary that were made to Camreta and Alford were
false. During the exam, S.G. was asked to undress, and examiners
inspected her body, at times with a magnifying glass, and took pictures
of her “private parts.”55 The exam did not reveal evidence of sexual
abuse.56 The Department of Human Services then asked the juvenile
court to return S.G. and K.G. to Sarah Greene’s custody, which the
court did.57
The criminal charges against Greene resulted in a plea deal:
Greene entered an Alford plea regarding the abuse of the unrelated
boy, and the charges that he abused S.G. were dismissed.58
S.G. testified in her deposition that she continued to feel guilty
for the false statements she made during her interrogation, and that she
felt “real bad” because those statements led to her removal from her
parents’ custody for several weeks and her father’s criminal
prosecution.59

B.

Similar Themes in Child Protection Searches and Seizures
Beyond Camreta

The Camreta facts evoke four key themes in child protection
investigations. First, child protection searches are often, though not
usually, genuinely joint efforts between civil and criminal law
enforcement agencies. Camreta investigated the basis for a civil child
welfare case and Alford the basis for a criminal case, and evidence
does not suggest that one was cover for the other. Such joint
investigations between civil child protection agencies and law
enforcement are commonplace, especially for allegations of sexual or
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id. at 1018-19.
The phrase “private parts” comes from S.G.’s deposition. Id. at 1019.
Id.
Id. at 1020.
Id.; see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-39 (1970).
Brief for Respondents, supra note 50, at 12 & n.12.
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physical abuse, where the facts, if accurate as alleged, typically
establish both civil and criminal violations. And as Coleman has
explained in detail, collaboration between child protection agencies
and law enforcement “is diverse and wide-ranging,” and it is likely to
expand because of pressure to coordinate investigations.60
Still, the extent of this collaboration ought not be overestimated,
and Coleman asks it to prove too much. Laws requiring the
notification of and cooperation with law enforcement apply to
investigations of physical or sexual abuse, not generally to neglect or to
less-severe allegations.61 But the majority of child protection
allegations and investigations are for neglect, not physical or sexual
abuse. Nationally, only 26.8% of substantiated cases involve physical
or sexual abuse, meaning the vast majority would not trigger
mandatory law enforcement involvement.62 Reported cases suggest
that even some physical abuse investigations do not involve police
officers or the expected sharing of information for law enforcement
purposes, rendering law enforcement entanglement a “contingency
[that] is certainly of secondary importance.”63 As Wayne LaFave has
pointed out, “[t]he police ordinarily need not be directly involved” in
child protection investigations.64 One nonlegal commentator has put it
60. Coleman, supra note 11, at 492-96.
61. E.g., TEX. FAM. CODE § 261.301(f), quoted in Roe v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective &
Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 407 (5th Cir. 2002). Although the line between allegations
that must be shared and those that need not be shared varies by state, some line between
severe and less-severe cases is common. See, e.g., ARK. CODE § 12-18-504 (2012) (requiring
reporting to law enforcement allegations of “severe maltreatment” only); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 17a-101b(c) (2012) (“sexual abuse or serious physical abuse” only); FLA. STAT. § 39.301(2)
(2012) (“criminal conduct” only); GA. CODE § 19-7-5(e) (2012) (abuse only); 325 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/7 (2012) (severe cases only, such as death, brain damage, skull fractures, torture of a
child, or sexual abuse); IOWA CODE § 232.70 (2011) (sexual abuse only); MISS. CODE § 4321-353(1) (2012) (sex abuse, serious physical injury, or other felony only); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7B-307(a) (2011) (abuse only); N.H. REV. STAT. § 169-C:38 (2002) (sexual abuse, “serious
bodily injury,” or other crime only); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6365(c) (2012) (specifically
referenced crimes such as homicide, sexual abuse, or serious physical injuries only).
62. Supra note 33 and accompanying text.
63. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 902 (7th Cir. 1986). Some statutes presume
police will infrequently join investigations of physical or sexual abuse. Texas law, for
instance, provides that “[t]he inability or unwillingness of a local law enforcement agency to
conduct a joint investigation” does not absolve a child protection agency of investigating.
TEX. FAM. CODE § 261.301(g) (2011); see also FLA. STAT. § 39.301(2) (2012) (giving law
enforcement discretion to accept or reject Florida Department of Children and Family
Services reports for criminal investigation).
64. 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 10.3, at 105 (4th ed. 2010 update); see
also Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 117 (permitting administrative and criminal sanctions for the
same action “cannot by itself defeat an administrative scheme, if the administrative category
is to exist at all”).
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more strongly: “[C]hild welfare agencies bear almost the complete
responsibility for investigating child abuse.”65
Second, even when law enforcement entanglement exists, the
search or seizure at issue may not implicate the Fourth Amendment
rights of the person who would bear any law enforcement
consequences.66 In Camreta, S.G. was seized and interrogated for two
hours, but her father was arrested and charged with sexual abuse; S.G.
faced no law enforcement consequences herself. Camreta’s argument
to the Supreme Court evoked this fact, framing the question presented
as the Fourth Amendment standard to be applied “when a witness is
temporarily detained.”67 This point affects searches and seizures of
children only; searches and seizures of parents who are suspected of
abuse or neglect, or of their homes, do implicate their Fourth
Amendment rights.
Third, specific child protection investigation steps occur
regardless of the veracity or severity of the allegation. For example,
the Investigations Practice Operational Manual of the District of
Columbia’s child welfare agency directs its investigators to “conduct a
thorough investigation” into every allegation of child abuse or
neglect.68 Each allegation triggers a requirement “to interview and
assess ALL children in the home,” and such interviews must include
physical observations (including photographs “when applicable or
appropriate”).69 Social workers must “examine” all “family living
areas,” “[d]etermine sleeping arrangements for all household
members,” and interview all household members.70 All these steps
must occur whenever somebody alleges that a child in a home has
been abused or neglected. That allegation could be severe (repeated
sexual abuse) or relatively minor (if a parent leaves a ten-year-old child
alone for several hours). The allegation could be from a credible
source (a pediatrician who has a record of making accurate allegations
and who saw the child in question immediately prior to making the
allegation) or a less credible one (an anonymous caller, a neighbor, a
65. RICHARD J. GELLES, THE BOOK OF DAVID: HOW PRESERVING FAMILIES CAN COST
CHILDREN’S LIVES 53 (1996).
66. The special needs doctrine’s focus on law enforcement consequences to the
individual seized is discussed infra Part III.C.
67. Brief for Petitioner at i, Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (Nos. 09-1454
and 09-1478), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/
publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10_09_1454_PetitionerBobCamreta.authcheckdam.pdf.
68. D.C. CHILD & FAMILY SERVS. AGENCY, supra note 40, at 76.
69. Id. at 77.
70. Id. at 86.
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family member, or an ex-partner of the parent who is in an ongoing
dispute with that parent). The allegation may be the latest in a pattern
of allegations from multiple sources about a family, or it may be the
first allegation. None of these variables affects the steps to be taken:
search every room of the home and interview all children and adults in
that home.
This phenomenon distinguishes child protection investigations
from law enforcement investigations, in which the probable cause
standard requires officials to evaluate a tipster’s “veracity,” “basis of
knowledge,” and “overall reliability” before determining whether
probable cause exists for a search or seizure in a criminal
investigation.71 No similar factual evaluation generally occurs in child
protection cases. By removing discretion from the decision to
investigate particular tips, the child protection system broadens the
scope of invasive investigations beyond what is necessary to protect
children. In an extreme example, a woman in a mental hospital
reported that her brother-in-law (with whom she had no contact for
eighteen months and regarding whom she had previously made a false
allegation) was in a satanic cult and planned to murder his two-yearold son on the Fall Equinox.72 Despite the informant’s unreliability and
lack of a basis of knowledge, authorities investigated the allegation,
removed both the children from their parents, and subjected the
children to abuse examinations (including body cavity examinations).
The children stayed in state custody for 2½ months before being
returned to their parents—with no evidence of any physical or sexual
abuse discovered.73 Less-extreme examples abound. A leading study
of a set of child protection investigations found that to a large “extent
. . . the system seems to be used for family and other quarrels,” that is,
ex-partners, family members, or neighbors reporting abuse or neglect
based on spite rather than evidence.74 The study found such reports
less likely to be substantiated than others, yet they triggered the same
invasive investigations.75
Although child protection law and policy prevent officials from
exercising the discretion to decline to investigate particular reports,
child protection investigators have a significant amount of discretion
71. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983).
72. Wallis ex rel. Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000).
73. Id. at 1132-35. The extreme state actions in Wallis should suffice to prove the
search and seizure unreasonable even if the special needs test applied.
74. WALDFOGEL, supra note 33, at 19.
75. Id.
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regarding when, where, and how to investigate, and they can use that
discretion to invade liberty more. Camreta, for instance, chose to
interview S.G. at her school, during the school day, and without
contacting her mother first, and—at least as alleged by S.G.—chose to
keep S.G. in a room with him until she agreed that her father had
molested her. Other reported cases reflect the wide variety of searches
performed by child protection investigators following their
interpretation of case-specific facts. Some are quite disturbing. One
investigator responded to a report that a six-year-old girl exhibited
some sexualized behavior and decided to take photographs of the
child’s vagina and buttocks, despite having no training in physically
examining children for evidence of sexual abuse. The investigator
made the child’s mother “spread [her] labia and buttocks” so that the
investigator could take pictures.76 The investigator’s supervisor
testified that this action was within the investigator’s discretion.77 The
child soon developed anxiety symptoms that required counseling, and
her mother was reduced to tears; no evidence of abuse was found.78
Fourth, it is exceedingly difficult to discern the truth about
specific allegations, and investigative steps taken by child protection
authorities can hinder the search for truth. Did Camreta pressure S.G.
into making false allegations, which she recanted when his highpressure interrogation ended? Or did S.G. tell the truth to Camreta,
only to later change her story to protect her family or because of
pressure from either or both of her parents? Quite simply, we will
never know. If we assume that Greene was guilty of abusing his
daughter, the facts of the interrogation (repeated, aggressive, leading
questions of a nine-year-old child afraid she would be kept from going
home) and S.G.’s subsequent recantation would make it difficult for
the government to meet its burden of proving that Greene did, in fact,
abuse S.G. These facts might make S.G.’s earlier statements
inadmissible.79 At the least, they would provide fertile grounds for
cross-examination of both S.G. and Camreta and make for an
76. Roe v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th
Cir. 2002).
77. Id. at 399.
78. Id.
79. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990). Wright ruled a 2½-year-old child’s
out-of-court statements inadmissible when they followed leading questions by a doctor. The
Court did not require a set of fixed procedural safeguards, id. at 818, but found the particular
statements at issue lacked sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to satisfy the Confrontation
Clause, id. at 827. Wright did not address whether such statements would be admissible
under rules of evidence in a civil case.

372

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:353

uncertain trial. Moreover, S.G.’s statements to Camreta were not
recorded, making independent verification of both her statements and
his questioning impossible. Effective investigative techniques are
essential to both identifying child abuse and neglect and to gathering
convincing evidence so that the state may act on it when appropriate.
States (including Oregon, where Camreta occurred) have developed
detailed guidelines to ensure appropriate techniques.80

C.

Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court Litigation’s Focus on Whether
It Was Primarily a Law Enforcement or Child Protection Seizure

The Ninth Circuit’s opinion, and Camreta’s and S.G.’s briefs to
the Supreme Court, focused precisely where the special needs doctrine
directed them to focus: on the presence of a law enforcement purpose
to Camreta and Alford’s seizure of S.G. In this focus, the Ninth Circuit
opinion and Supreme Court litigation illustrate some of the deeper
problems in that doctrine.
Judge Marsha Berzon’s Ninth Circuit opinion concluded that the
extensive entanglement between civil and criminal child abuse
investigations generally, and in the investigations regarding S.G. and
her father specifically, rendered the special needs doctrine
inapplicable.81 But the opinion also expressed some discomfort with
that result, acknowledging that protecting children through the civil
foster care system and criminally sanctioning child abusers are both
“governmental activity of the highest importance.”82 Despite the great
importance of both civil and criminal purposes, the existence of only
the latter determined the Ninth Circuit’s result.
Camreta’s arguments to the Supreme Court in favor of applying
the special needs doctrine, and S.G.’s rebuttals, also illustrate some of
the difficulties created by the special needs binary. Camreta offered
one argument relying on that binary, focusing on the lack of law
enforcement consequences for S.G.,83 then a second argument that
explicitly sought to merge criminal and civil investigations.84 The first
80. SHERRY BOHANNAN ET AL., CRIME VICTIMS’ ASSISTANCE SECTION, OR. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, OREGON INTERVIEWING GUIDELINES (2d ed. 2004), available at http://www.doj.state.
or.us/victims/pdf/orinterviewingguide.pdf.
81. Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1025-30 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated in part, 131
S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
82. Id. at 1029.
83. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 19-21, 27-29. Camreta also offered an
analogy to school search cases, which he argued lessened children’s expectation of privacy.
Id. at 30-34. That argument is discussed infra note 141.
84. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 30-34.
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argument ignores crucial elements of S.G.’s story, and the second runs
headlong into the special needs doctrine’s binary.
Camreta first argued that S.G. was a mere witness, an argument
that only makes sense if one focuses entirely on criminal consequences. Camreta relied on an earlier special needs case, Illinois v.
Lidster, that upheld police officers’ right to briefly stop motorists to
inquire whether they were witnesses to a crime at the location of the
stop, and Camreta argued that like those motorists, S.G. was a
potential witness to a crime and not a suspect.85 If one considers only
the criminal investigation, this analogy has some force. But S.G. faced
much more serious consequences than being made a witness in a
criminal case. Her seizure and interrogation led the state to forcibly
remove her and her sister from both her father and her mother and to
place them in state custody for several weeks. S.G.’s seizure and
interrogation thus led directly to the emotional harms that are caused
when the state separates children from their parents, deprived her of
physical liberty by placing her in state custody, and subjected her to the
various well-documented risks of living in foster care.86 Those
concerns, however, all fall on the noncriminal side of the special needs
binary, preventing S.G. from making those arguments without also
attacking the special needs doctrine that had granted her victory in the
Ninth Circuit. Rather than argue those points, S.G. was forced to
distinguish the motorist-witness case on other grounds: the length and
character of the seizure.87 These factors relate to the reasonableness of
the seizure, an analysis that is only relevant when the special needs
doctrine applies.88
Camreta next argued that states should be permitted to follow the
“best practice” of interviewing potential child abuse victims in “a
single joint interview with law enforcement and child-protective
caseworkers present.”89 Joint interviews reflect the understanding that
authorities can emotionally traumatize a child by forcing them to tell
85. Id. at 19-21, 37-38 (citing Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 425 (2004)). The
United States, as amicus curiae, similarly argued that absent a “serious threat of prolonged
incarceration or other punishment,” S.G.’s seizure did not violate her Fourth Amendment
rights. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 26, Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020
(2011) (Nos. 09-1451 and 09-1478), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10_09_1454_PetitionerAmCuUS
A.authcheckdam.pdf.
86. Erik Pitchal, Children’s Constitutional Right to Counsel in Dependency Cases, 15
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 663, 676-77 (2006).
87. Brief for Respondents, supra note 50, at 55-56.
88. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
89. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 28-29.

374

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:353

and retell to multiple audiences how a close family member physically
or sexually abused them.90 Such teams could also include expert
forensic interviewers, whose involvement could prevent false
allegations or doubtful statements that flow from poorly conducted
interviews.91
But such multidisciplinary collaboration requires
breaking down lines between law enforcement and other agencies—
the same lines that are bolstered by the special needs test. Camreta’s
brief left unclear exactly how the concern with higher-quality
interviewers ought to fit into the Fourth Amendment analysis.
Like Camreta’s first argument, S.G. framed her presentation to
the Court based on the special needs binary. The first sentence in her
Fourth Amendment argument emphasized the law enforcement
entanglement, noting that this case involved “an armed, uniformed
sheriff’s deputy.”92 S.G. focused on the extensive law enforcement
entanglement in the particular search to argue against the special needs
doctrine’s application.93
Several Justices’ questions during oral argument suggested some
discomfort with the analysis created by this binary. Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg asked, in essence, what was so special about a law
enforcement purpose: “Suppose we take the sheriff, deputy sheriff,
out. The only one who comes to the school and asks to talk to this
child is the caseworker from the [child protection agency]?”94
Counsel’s answer, taken straight from the special needs doctrine, was
that “it would depend on . . . whether or not there was police
entanglement.”95 This answer, though rooted in the Supreme Court’s
own, oft-repeated holdings, provoked an extended dialogue, in which
90. Accordingly, Congress has urged states to use multidisciplinary teams to
investigate abuse allegations. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(a)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011), cited in
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 28.
91. See Lindsay E. Cronch et al., Forensic Interviewing in Child Sexual Abuse Cases:
Current Techniques and Future Directions, 11 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 195, 196
(2006) (noting that poorly conducted interviews can lead to false allegations). That Camreta
relied on this authority, Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 29, is not without irony; Camreta
and Alford did not interview S.G. through a multidisciplinary team or a trained forensic
interviewer, and S.G. alleged that Camreta used precisely the kind of bad interviewing
techniques that lead to false allegations. Moreover, S.G. alleged that her mother would have
consented—and, in fact, did consent (though Camreta and Alford did not act on her
consent)—to an appropriate multidisciplinary interview, which would have made any Fourth
Amendment issues moot. Brief for Respondents, supra note 50, at 68-69.
92. Brief for Respondents, supra note 50, at 43.
93. Id. at 71-74.
94. Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011)
(Nos. 09-1454 and 09-1478).
95. Id.
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Justices Samuel Alito, Stephen Breyer, and Antonin Scalia proposed
various hypotheticals suggesting that S.G.’s proposed test led to
insupportable lines.96 A school nurse could likely take a child into their
office, but S.G. argued that an outside official could not do so “to deal
with situations that are not related to the school.”97 S.G. conceded that
an outside nurse could bring the child to their office to address the
child’s possible illness,98 leading to this ultimate question from Justice
Scalia: “[L]ikewise, it’s not a nurse, but it’s a social worker who’s
brought in to interrogate the child about something else that is going to
very much harm that child, why is that any different?”99 Counsel’s
answer: “Well, Your Honor, because child welfare investigations are
also harmful to children. And when—when a child is asked,
interrogated about whether or not her father touches her
inappropriately, that’s not a neutral action. Whether or not she has
been abused that causes trauma to the child.”100
The striking things about this dialogue are, first, how the Justices
looked for a test other than law enforcement entanglement and, second,
how nothing in the dialogue seemed to provide an adequate test.
Counsel’s final answer that child welfare investigations are different
because the investigations themselves harm children may be right. But
school disciplinary actions can also harm children.101 And the law
generally views medical treatment for an illness (an example identified
as acceptable by Justice Scalia and S.G.’s counsel) as an infringement
on bodily integrity and thus a battery unless done with consent.102 Oral
argument thus ended with several Justices hinting that the special
needs framework may not suffice to answer Fourth Amendment
questions in child protection cases and with the dialogue failing to
identify satisfying alternative tests. The Court declined to discuss
these issues further, deciding the case on jurisdictional grounds.103

Id. at 40-46.
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 44.
See, e.g., RUSSELL J. SKIBA, IND. EDUC. POLICY CTR., ZERO EVIDENCE, ZERO
TOLERANCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINARY PRACTICE (2000), available at http://
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

www.indiana.edu/~safeschl/ztze.pdf (criticizing strict disciplinary policies).
102. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE,
POLICY AND PRACTICE 710 (4th ed. 2010).
103. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 94, at 51.
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Circuit Court Opinions in Other CPS Search and Seizure Cases
Also Focus on the Special Needs Test

The Camreta litigants were not alone in their focus on law
enforcement entanglement. Synthesizing various circuit courts’
rulings in child protection cases, Wayne LaFave’s Fourth Amendment
treatise focuses on the existence of any such entanglement. When
police are not included in the search, as they often are not, and when a
child abuse investigation is “sufficiently disentangled from general law
enforcement purposes,” then the “valid administrative purpose” of
protecting children from abuse creates a special need justifying a lower
standard than probable cause.104 Otherwise, they would not qualify for
the lower standard applied via the special needs doctrine.
LaFave accurately accounts for how at least five circuit courts
(including the Ninth Circuit, in Camreta and earlier decisions) have
addressed these cases, with a particular focus on whether they fall on
the special needs or normal law enforcement side of the special needs
doctrine’s bright line.105 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit’s 2008 decision in Gates v. Texas Department of
Protective and Regulatory Services illustrates the point.106
Investigating allegations that Gary Gates physically abused some or all
of his thirteen children, child protection investigators took several steps
that involved law enforcement. They took one child to a “child
104. LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 10.3, at 106.
105. See Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining why it
would not apply T.L.O. to a child protective search).
106. 537 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2008). The Second Circuit has illustrated the same point,
declaring a vaginal and anal examination of a five-year-old child that revealed no evidence of
abuse unconstitutional because no special need existed in that particular case, though it
suggested such a need might exist in a future case. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581,
588-91, 603-04 (2d Cir. 1999) (summarizing the facts of the underlying search and seizure).
So has the Seventh Circuit, applying T.L.O. to a child protection worker’s search of a child’s
body for injuries on public school premises absent any law enforcement involvement or
purpose. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 900-02 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Jones v. Hunt,
410 F.3d 1221, 1227-29 (10th Cir. 2005) (discussing, but not deciding, whether T.L.O.
applied because the alleged conduct would have violated any Fourth Amendment standard);
J.B. v. Washington County, 127 F.3d 919, 929-30 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting the special needs
question, but concluding that probable cause existed and so the search was valid regardless of
the doctrine’s application).
Tenenbaum received prominent discussion in a later edition of the seminal work, The
Best Interests of the Child: The Least Detrimental Alternative. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE (1996). They
conclude that Tenenbaum’s search and seizure “traumatized both [the daughter] and her
parents” and had “no justification.” Id. at 124. Goldstein and his coauthors’ broader
comments that suggest a significant change in child protection investigations are discussed
infra note 307 and accompanying text.

2012]

BEYOND LAW ENFORCEMENT

377

advocacy center” interview that was witnessed by child protection and
law enforcement authorities.107 They also searched the Gates’ family
home with deputy sheriffs.108 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the
search of the Gates’ home “was closely tied with law enforcement”
and thus the special needs doctrine did not apply.109
The special needs doctrine’s current iteration has failed to lead to
results that create clear rules or justifiable distinctions between the
wide variety of child protection searches and seizures. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has distinguished
between child protection searches and seizures that take place at public
schools (and where authorities have a freer hand within the Seventh
Circuit) and those at private schools. Seventh Circuit cases have
created that distinction without analyzing the law enforcement
entanglement (or lack thereof).110 And in another setting, the Seventh
Circuit has adjudicated a Fourth Amendment child protection case
challenging state officials’ seizure of a child from his home without
reference to its prior precedent or to the special needs doctrine.111 The
United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Tenth Circuits
have explicitly left open the question of whether the special needs
doctrine applies to any child protection searches, or only to those with
law enforcement involvement.112

E.

Special Needs Doctrine’s Failure To Provide Satisfying Answers
in Camreta and Other Child Protection Search and Seizure Cases

If courts followed the special needs doctrine in Camreta, they
might reasonably reach the same results as the Ninth Circuit and
several other circuit courts. I agree with that result, but the reasoning
would be unsatisfying. It would vindicate S.G.’s claim based on a
107. Gates, 537 F.3d at 413.
108. Id. at 414. The sheriff’s office may also have been called because Texas law
requires child protection authorities to notify law enforcement authorities of all child abuse
reports and to engage law enforcement in a joint investigation of allegations of immediate
risk of physical abuse—as was the case in this investigation. Id. at 423 (citing TEX. FAM.
CODE §§ 261.105(b), .301(f)).
109. Id. at 424. In an earlier case, the Fifth Circuit had held that Texas law entangled
sex abuse investigations with law enforcement, even without law enforcement participation in
a search, by requiring notification of cooperation with law enforcement for such
investigations. Roe v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 407 (5th
Cir. 2002).
110. Michael C. v. Gresbach, 526 F.3d 1008, 1018 (7th Cir. 2008).
111. Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1009-12 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussing a
Fourth Amendment claim without reference to the special needs doctrine).
112. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 604 (2d Cir. 1999); J.B. v. Washington
County, 127 F.3d 919, 919 (10th Cir. 1997).

378

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:353

factor—Alford’s involvement and presence—that was of little
importance to S.G. herself. It would fail to provide a meaningful
analysis of a significant purpose of child protection searches and
seizures: investigative steps to determine if the state should infringe on
the fundamental right of family integrity. It would instead elevate the
state’s law enforcement purpose above the civil child protection
purpose despite the fact that both represent, as the Ninth Circuit noted,
“governmental activity of the highest importance.”113 It would draw a
line between those two highly important purposes when the current
trend rightly seeks to merge those purposes into a united investigation
to minimize the number of interviews of potential child victims.114
And it would entirely ignore the millions of child protection
investigations (probably the majority of such investigations) that lack a
law enforcement component, yet implicate the same fundamental
rights. In so doing, it would lead to odd, if not perverse, results: it
would be easier for child protection authorities to invade family
privacy to investigate allegations of neglect, which are the kind of
allegations that do not trigger automatic requirements of reporting to
law enforcement,115 than it would be to investigate allegations of more
serious abuse.116
Applying the current special needs doctrine could also plausibly
have led to a different result in Camreta. As Camreta argued, S.G., and
children in child protection investigations more generally, do not face
criminal consequences, thus making them appear more like potential
witnesses than targets of ordinary law enforcement activity. This
analysis might lead to a different result than the Ninth Circuit reached
in Camreta, but would not change the result in child protection
investigations of parents’ homes, as in Gates, where law enforcement
was also involved in those searches. This result, too, makes little
sense. It would unduly prioritize parents’ privacy interests over
113. Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d, 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated in part, 131 S.
Ct. 2020 (2011).
114. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse has suggested that avoiding duplicative interviews
both reduces the risk of traumatizing children through forced discussions of potential abuse
and improves the quality of interviews. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Constitutional Rights
of Parents and Children in Child Protective and Juvenile Delinquency Investigations 13 (Sept.
28, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1934868.
115. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
116. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757,
801 (1994) (“If taken seriously, this [focus on criminal purpose] would mean that, as between
two equally unintrusive but low-probability searches, the search justified by a more
compelling purpose—criminal enforcement to protect person and property—is less
constitutionally proper.”).
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children’s, even though it is children who are at risk of being taken into
state custody, and it would prioritize the potential criminal
consequences for parents over the loss of their children to foster care.
Neither approach furthers sound analysis of child protection
investigations. Neither accounts for the immense family integrity
interests at stake for both children and parents. Neither incentivizes
higher-quality interviews than those in Camreta by prioritizing highquality forensic interviewing techniques. And neither requires child
protection agencies to adjust their one-size-fits-all approach to
investigations and to calibrate the level of investigation to the specific
allegation and its credibility.
III. SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE’S UNJUSTIFIED LINE AROUND LAW
ENFORCEMENT SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The difficulties apparent in Camreta and other child protection
cases result directly from the special needs doctrine developed by the
Supreme Court. That doctrine requires one to discern the “primary . . .
programmatic purpose”117 of a particular search and seizure: “the
normal need for law enforcement”118 or some other end. This Part will
explore how that binary developed without ever adequately justifying
what distinguishes law enforcement searches and seizures from all
other searches or seizures. The absence of a law enforcement purpose
links the various types of cases that fall under the special needs rubric:
home safety inspections, suspicionless drug testing, school discipline
searches, highway checkpoints, and others.119 That absence is the
threshold criteria for all special needs cases, and, as such, the Court’s
failure to provide some insight into it is glaring.
Despite failing to justify the bright line around law enforcement
searches and seizures, the special needs case law provides some
support for the reforms proposed in Part IV. The case law focuses on
the constitutional consequences that result from particular searches
and seizures, which form one of the bases for the proposal to redraw
the special needs’ bright line around all searches and seizures that
threaten a significant invasion of fundamental constitutional rights.
117. Ferguson II, 532 U.S. 67, 81 (2001).
118. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
119. Different types of special needs cases do involve somewhat different analyses; for
instance, executive branch discretion may be less concerning in a school discipline search,
which depends on giving school officials discretion to respond to varied circumstances, than
it is when applying a blanket drug test or checkpoint regime to all people meeting certain
criteria. Primus, supra note 14, at 271 (contrasting special subpopulation and dragnet
searches).
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And the case law does discuss the value of some limitation on
government officials’ discretion, an important value that a reformed
special needs doctrine should reflect.
This Part will trace the special needs doctrine from its origins in
Camara v. Municipal Court through its naming in T.L.O. and its
development in the quarter-century since, highlighting both the
absence of a justification for the bright line around law enforcement
searches and seizures and the presence of other themes relevant to a
reformed doctrine.

A. Origins: Camara v. Municipal Court
A critical analysis of the Court’s first modern administrative
search case, Camara, supports three points important to this Article’s
argument.120 First, Camara demonstrates the importance of the
constitutional consequences that result from a particular search or
refusal to consent to such a search. Second, Camara’s attempt to
distinguish between criminal investigations and health and safety
inspections shows the lack of a historical basis for a bright line around
the former. Third, Camara highlights the importance of evaluating
executive discretion when determining whether a warrant is important,
a key point missing from the current special needs doctrine.
Camara’s holding relates directly to the consequences of a
proposed administrative search: Roland Camara faced a criminal
prosecution for refusing to permit a municipal employee to inspect his
home for compliance with the local housing code. The Supreme Court
held that one could not be criminally punished for refusing to consent
to a warrantless search of one’s home, a holding that followed the dicta
of an earlier case, which indicated that “[t]he right to privacy in the
home holds too high a place in our system of laws to justify” a
criminal consequence for refusal to permit an administrative actor’s
warrantless entry.121
Before reaching that conclusion, the Court analyzed how the
proposed health and safety inspection might trigger different concerns
than a criminal investigation, an analysis so muddled that it illustrates
the absence of a principled line around law enforcement purposes.
The Court first wrote as if it would deny the entire concept of
administrative searches and treat them identically to criminal searches:
“It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private
120. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
121. District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1, 7 (1950).
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property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the
individual is suspected of criminal behavior.”122 But the Camara Court
then significantly limited its holding, acknowledging the importance
of such searches and that “routine periodic inspections of all
structures” were necessary to enforce reasonable municipal regulations.123 This necessity correlated to a relatively small privacy interest
“because the inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the
discovery of evidence of crime[;] they involve a relatively limited
invasion of the urban citizen’s privacy.”124 Camara thus simultaneously
suggests that the noncriminal purpose of a search does not justify
diminishing Fourth Amendment protections and that a noncriminal
purpose reduces the privacy interest to the point that individualized
suspicion is not necessary, the seed of the doctrine later named
“special needs.”
Camara overruled a 1959 health inspection case, Frank v.
Maryland,125 and tried, unpersuasively, to rely on statements by the
Frank majority and dissent to support a distinction between law
enforcement and other types of searches.126 Although the Frank
majority had suggested such a distinction,127 its view was overruled in
Camara, and the Frank dissent (whose viewpoint became the majority
viewpoint in Camara) merely said that the facts necessary to establish
probable cause would differ in a health inspection case from those in a
criminal investigation.128 The relevant sections of both the majority and
dissent in Frank cited an earlier case,129 Boyd v. United States,130 but
disputed its meaning.131 Boyd itself was ambiguous regarding which
122. Camara, 387 U.S. at 530.
123. Id. at 535-36.
124. Id. at 537.
125. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). Frank held that a criminal conviction for refusing a
warrantless health inspection of a home did not violate the Fourth or Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. at 373. Camara explicitly overruled this holding. 387 U.S. at 528.
126. Camara, 387 U.S. at 537-38.
127. The Frank Court opined that “the safeguards necessary for a search of evidence
of criminal acts” would “greatly hobble[]” health inspections. 359 U.S. at 372, quoted in
Camara, 387 U.S. at 537.
128. Frank, 359 U.S. at 383 (Douglas, J., dissenting) quoted in Camara, 387 U.S. at
538. Justice William Douglas’s dissent also argued that the Fourth Amendment provides
meaningful protections beyond criminal investigations, describing anything else as a
“fallacy.” Id. at 377.
129. Id. at 372-73 (majority opinion); id. at 383 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
130. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Boyd referred to “official acts and proceedings” that
triggered the warrant requirement. Id. at 624.
131. The Frank majority distinguished “official acts and proceedings” from the health
inspections at issue, 359 U.S. at 372-73 (majority opinion), while the dissent treated the
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types of searches and seizures would trigger a warrant requirement.
On one hand, Boyd applied the warrant and probable cause
requirements to a civil case involving forfeiture of goods that the
government alleged to have been imported without payment of the
proper customs duty.132 On the other hand, the Boyd Court also
discussed how the forfeiture proceeding, “though technically a civil
proceeding, [was] in substance and effect a criminal one,” or at a least
a “quasi criminal” one, because evidence justifying forfeiture would
also have justified criminal sanctions for defrauding the government of
revenue.133 Whatever lesson might be taken from Frank and Boyd, it is
not, as Camara asserted, that a clear Fourth Amendment distinction
exists between civil and criminal searches and seizures.
Camara did impose a warrant requirement for a reason that
continues to resonate (even if the present special needs doctrine avoids
it): some check on executive branch discretion must exist to protect
individual privacy, and only a warrant decision by a “disinterested
party” could suffice.134 Limiting executive discretion is undoubtedly
an essential purpose of the warrant requirement,135 and the Court
discussed the level of discretion permitted by varying administrative
schemes in a variety of cases decided in the fifteen years following
Camara.136
health inspection as precisely within the Boyd “official acts and proceedings” category, id. at
383 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
132. The government had acted under a statute permitting it to obtain business records
of importers as long as the demand occurred in “suits and proceedings other than criminal.”
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 619 (quoting Law of June 22, 1874, ch. 391, § 5, 18 Stat. 187 (1874)). This
view of Boyd comports with the Framers’ concern about British “writs of assistance,” which
permitted searches of any location without probable cause and without any criminal purpose.
Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 115.
133. 116 U.S. at 634. This language is also tied to the specific litigation purpose for
which the government sought documents in Boyd : the government filed a civil forfeiture
suit, at least partly as a vehicle to demand production of documents regarding the items
seized, that could have incriminated the individuals involved, thus raising Fifth Amendment
concerns. Id. at 634-35; see also id. at 639 (Miller, J., concurring) (“[T]he effect of the act of
Congress is to compel the party on whom the order of the court is served to be a witness
against himself.”).
134. A government could obtain a warrant “if reasonable legislative or administrative
standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular
dwelling.” Camara, 387 U.S. at 538. Schulhofer described this flexible standard as
“antithetical to the traditional conception of ‘probable cause.’” Schulhofer, supra note 4, at
91; see Camara, 387 U.S. at 532-33.
135. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 411 (1974).
136. These cases are discussed in some detail by Primus, supra note 14, at 268-70, and
underscore the essential point from Camara : that the level of discretion held by a
government official under a particular statutory or regulatory scheme is important in
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T.L.O. Special Needs Test

Eighteen years after Camara, Justice Harold Blackmun gave the
special needs doctrine its name and stated the rule that would be
applied in future cases in a concurring opinion in T.L.O : “Only in
those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probablecause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its
balancing of interests for that of the Framers,”137 that is, to determine
whether a search meets Fourth Amendment “reasonableness”
standards rather than demand a warrant and probable cause. T.L.O.
upheld a high school assistant principal’s search of a fourteen-year-old
student. The decision (including Justice Blackmun’s concurrence)
lauded school officials’ use of discretion, and thus broke with
Camara’s focus on a warrant requirement as a check on executive
branch discretion. Justice Blackmun was also silent regarding the
consequences of the challenged search. Justice Blackmun was
consistent with Camara on other central points: he articulated a bright
line between law enforcement purposes and all other purposes without
any adequate justification. He also articulated a test that has the
potential to permit the modern administrative state’s operation and to
prevent its less-invasive actions from providing cover for its more
invasive actions.
In T.L.O., an assistant principal suspected T.L.O. of smoking a
cigarette in the school bathroom, which was a violation of school rules,
but not a crime. He took T.L.O. to his office and searched her purse,
finding both a pack of cigarettes and rolling papers. Suspecting, based
on the rolling papers, that her purse might contain more evidence of
illegal drug possession, a crime, he searched further and found
marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and documents implicating T.L.O. in
drug dealing. The assistant principal then turned the evidence over to
the police. The case reached the Supreme Court through litigation
over T.L.O.’s motion to suppress the evidence found by the assistant
principal in the state’s ensuing delinquency case against her.138 Finding
a warrant requirement and probable cause inapplicable to searches

determining whether a detached and neutral magistrate must issue a warrant. See also
Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 93-101 (summarizing developments in the law between Camara
and T.L.O.).
137. 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 329 (majority opinion).
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motivated by school discipline, which required quick, flexible, and
informal action, the Court approved the search.139
The most important difference between T.L.O. and Camara rests
in their treatment of the warrant requirement. While Camara looked to
the warrant requirement as a means to limit executive branch officials’
discretion, T.L.O. saw it as an obstacle to the exercise of executive
branch officials’ discretion in a situation where such discretion is
important.140 The search of T.L.O.’s purse qualified as a special need
beyond the need for law enforcement because it was incident to
establishing discipline and maintaining order in schools, tasks which
require immediate action and which a warrant requirement would
impede, even though children did have some expectation of privacy at
school.141 Although analysis of how an administrative scheme can
cabin officials’ discretion and thus replace a judicial warrant continues
in business regulation cases,142 T.L.O. represented a sharp shift in
which limiting discretion no longer became a requirement of avoiding
a warrant procedure.
But the special need of prompt school discipline only partly
explains T.L.O.; the absence of a law enforcement purpose is equally
important. It is certainly true that the warrant requirement would
interfere with school officials’ actions to enforce school rules. But it
also interferes with police officers’ criminal investigations—

139. Id. at 347-48.
140. See Primus, supra note 14, at 278 (describing dragnet searches as those that
required some mechanism to “cabin[] executive discretion” and special subpopulation
searches as those that “required that the Court give executive officials the discretion
necessary to pick out certain individuals for differential treatment”).
141. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also id. at 338-41
(majority opinion). Primus categorizes T.L.O. as a special subpopulation search, because
children at school have reduced expectations of privacy. Primus, supra note 14, at 270-71.
Indeed, the Court has sometimes suggested that children have less privacy rights at school.
See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995) (“[W]hile children
assuredly do not ‘shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate,’ the nature of
those rights is what is appropriate for children in school.” (citation omitted) (quoting Tinker v.
Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969))). Nonetheless, a generalization
that T.L.O.’s holding applies equally to any search or seizure of a child at school, regardless of
any connection to maintaining discipline, takes T.L.O. a step too far. Henning, supra note 24,
at 68-69. The state officials pushed exactly that broad a generalization in Camreta, arguing
that children’s lessened privacy in school justified the seizure of S.G. Brief for Petitioner,
supra note 67, at 30-34. A child protection investigation does not fit well into T.L.O.’s focus
on prompt discipline: the investigation responds to out-of-school allegations, not to any
student behavioral issues in school, and not to any curricular or pedagogic purposes.
142. E.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987). Burger’s potential lessons for
special needs cases are discussed more broadly infra notes 233-235 and accompanying text.

2012]

BEYOND LAW ENFORCEMENT

385

interference the law accepts.143 As important as public education is, it
would be hard to argue that it is so much more important than public
safety and criminal justice that it should be excepted from the Fourth
Amendment limitations imposed on criminal investigations. The
difference between the two types of searches, therefore, rests on the
level of intrusion into protected privacy interests. And by the plain
language of the special needs doctrine, it is not only the presence of a
special need, but also the absence of a law enforcement purpose that
establishes such a limited intrusion.
Like Camara, T.L.O. failed to explain what it is about normal law
enforcement searches that makes them so special that only individuals
subject to them should enjoy the fullest Fourth Amendment
protections.
Justice Blackmun’s opinion identified non-lawenforcement needs; his examples included the need to police the
border and to ensure an officer’s safety during a Terry stop-and-frisk,144
but did not justify the general rule. His only reference to law
enforcement’s special status is an oblique reference to Camara’s
language about searches not “aimed at the discovery of evidence of
crime.”145 Moreover, both Justice Blackmun’s concurrence and the
plurality ignored the law enforcement consequence that actually
resulted from the search: a delinquency case against T.L.O. The Court
did not address whether the assistant principal intended to involve law
enforcement at the time he extended his search or only decided to do
so after completing the search.146 It is certainly plausible, if not likely,
that when the assistant principal decided to search T.L.O.’s purse
further, he did so intending to find evidence of a crime and turn it over
to law enforcement, thus transforming the purpose of a search from a
school discipline search to one that also had law enforcement
purposes. But the plurality simply concluded that the assistant
principal had reasonable suspicion to search T.L.O.’s purse for more
evidence of drugs, without considering whether that search had a law
143. Cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 & n.12 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the “beneficent” law enforcement purpose is “immaterial” to the
constitutionality of a warrantless wiretap and favorably quoting the argument that “it is better
that a few criminals escape than that the privacies of life of all the people be exposed to the
agents of the government”).
144. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 352.
145. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967). Justice Blackmun cited the
page of Camara, including the quoted language, without explanation as to what exactly on
that page he relied upon. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice
Blackmun’s text prior to this cite related to roving United States Border Patrol stops, which
are not discussed in Camara. Id.
146. See Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 101 (criticizing T.L.O. on similar grounds).
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enforcement purpose.147 Justice Blackmun’s concurrence did not even
address this issue. T.L.O. thus left unexplored the question of how to
determine the validity of a search that could have had both law
enforcement and school disciplinary purposes, and at which point the
latter serves as a subterfuge for the former—questions that have
become more important as school discipline and law enforcement have
become increasingly entangled.148

C.

Special Needs Test Applied

Since T.L.O., several developments have occurred. First, the
Supreme Court has applied the special needs test repeatedly, making it
“the official formulation of the threshold inquiry” and essential to the
results in administrative search cases.149 Second, the Supreme Court
has refocused the special needs doctrine on the consequences that
result from a particular search and seizure, and not simply the search
and seizure itself. The present special needs doctrine is best
understood with this gloss on Justice Blackmun’s language: the
presence or absence of a law enforcement consequence to the
individual who was searched or seized is highly relevant, and likely
determinative, of whether a particular action qualifies as a special need
or normal law enforcement search or seizure.
The Supreme Court has applied the T.L.O. concurrence’s test
repeatedly in a range of administrative search cases. In O’Connor v.
Ortega, the Court addressed a state hospital’s search of the office of a
doctor following allegations of financial mismanagement, but no
element of the search was turned over to law enforcement authorities.150
The search furthered the hospital’s needs as an employer, not its need
to establish a criminal case, thus, with multiple cites to Justice
Blackmun’s T.L.O. concurrence, the Court upheld the search.151
Applying O’Connor ’s analysis, City of Ontario v. Quon upheld a
search of a public employee’s text messages sent on a governmentowned mobile device as part of an investigation into excess mobile
charges and where the only consequence was job discipline.152 The
Court also upheld blood and urine drug tests of railway employees for
147. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 347.
148. Josh Kagan, Reappraising T.L.O.’s “Special Needs” Doctrine in an Era of SchoolLaw Enforcement Entanglement, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 291, 295-96 (2004).
149. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 109; see also Primus, supra note 14, at 288
(describing “extension” of the special needs test to dragnet cases).
150. 480 U.S. 709, 714 (1987).
151. Id. at 720, 724-25.
152. 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2632-33 (2010).
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the purpose of ensuring railway safety, relying on T.L.O.153 The Court
similarly upheld urinalysis drug testing of customs employees in
positions that involved access to drugs, firearms, or classified material,
and where employees who tested positive could be fired, but would
have faced no criminal consequences.154 Urinalysis of public high
school students participating in athletics and other extracurricular
organizations, where drug test results would lead to school
consequences but no criminal or delinquency case, was similarly
upheld, with the Supreme Court emphasizing the absence of law
enforcement consequences.155
The Court’s application of the special needs test is generally
outcome-determinative. If a search or seizure serves a special need
apart from ordinary law enforcement, the Court proceeds to balance an
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy with the government’s
and public’s interests in the challenged action.156 In practice,
determining that a search serves a special need other than law
enforcement nearly invariably leads to the conclusion that the search or
seizure is reasonable.157 Conversely, when the Supreme Court has
found that a challenged action has a law enforcement purpose, it has
held that action to be a Fourth Amendment violation.158 When the
Court has found a special need apart from ordinary law enforcement, it
has upheld challenged searches and seizures.159 It took twenty-four
years from the time T.L.O. was decided for the Court to provide an
exception to this rule,160 holding in Safford Unified School District No.
153. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (citing Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., concurring))).
154. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 662 (1989).
155. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829, 833-34 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J
v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 651, 658 (1995).
156. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that only when special
needs beyond law enforcement exist “is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests
for that of the Framers”).
157. See Primus, supra note 14, at 257 (searches deemed special needs “are almost
always deemed reasonable”).
158. Ferguson II, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32
(2000).
159. Earls, 536 U.S. at 838; Acton, 515 U.S. at 664-65; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 662;
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 347-48.
160. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997), is not an exception to this rule, even
though the Court found a Fourth Amendment violation in a case not involving a law
enforcement search. Id. at 323. In Chandler, the Court held that a state law requiring
candidates for certain offices to take a drug test violated their Fourth Amendment rights. Id.
at 322-23. Although there was no contention that such searches served law enforcement
needs—“the results of the test are given first to the candidate, who controls further
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1 v. Redding that a strip search of a teenage girl, with no law
enforcement purpose or consequence, violated her Fourth Amendment
rights.161 But even Safford is not particularly strong; the Court claimed
it simply applied T.L.O.’s balancing test, yet still found that qualified
immunity protected the defendants, and so the teenager had no actual
remedy.162
The two most important post-T.L.O. special needs cases, for this
Article’s purposes, are Ferguson II 163 and Illinois v. Lidster.164 Both
focus on the particular consequences of a challenged search or seizure
to the individual searched or seized as the primary means of applying
the special needs test. Ferguson II involved drug tests designed to
protect children from prenatal drug exposure. In 1989, a task force
including a South Carolina public hospital, local police, the county
Substance Abuse Commission, and the Department of Social Services
developed a policy for testing women for substance abuse during
pregnancy and immediately after childbirth.165 Hospital staff would
notify police of positive drug tests, and arrest and prosecution would
Involved staff would follow chain-of-custody
soon follow.166
procedures, “presumably to make sure that the results could be used in
subsequent criminal proceedings.”167
The challenged policy also allowed information to be shared with
child protection authorities, although the Court did not note this fact.
Hospital officials disclosed the results of drug tests with an
interdisciplinary group that met at the hospital for Suspected Child
Abuse and Neglect (SCAN) meetings that included the Department of

dissemination of the report”—the Court found that no special need existed. Id. at 318, 322.
Without evidence of an actual problem of drug users holding particular offices, the Court
found that the state’s proffered need was not “important enough” to qualify as a special need.
Id. at 318. Chandler thus stands for the proposition, tangential to this Article, that a special
need must indeed be special. Id.
161. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
162. Barry Feld describes Safford as a “fact-specific limited right without any
practical remedy,” not a significant challenge to the rule. Barry C. Feld, T.L.O. and Redding’s

Unanswered (Misanswered) Fourth Amendment Questions:
Remedies, 80 MISS. L.J. 847, 870 (2011).

Few Rights and Fewer

163. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
164. 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
165. Ferguson II, 532 U.S. at 70-71.
166. Id. at 72 & n.5. The hospital soon adjusted its procedures: after a first positive
drug test, women could avoid police involvement by consenting to substance abuse treatment.
A second positive drug test would trigger police notification. Id.
167. Id. at 71-72.
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Social Services.168 The hospital informed women who tested positive
upon birth that “a referral had been made to the Department of Social
Services.”169 A hospital letter to patients summarized its policy and
listed the police, prosecutors, child protection authorities, and others
who would be involved if women did not obtain treatment.170 But these
facts did not feature prominently in the Ferguson II litigation, which
focused instead on the role of law enforcement and ignored child
protection, starting with the district court’s jury instructions.171 The
circuit court’s first opinion did not even address the child protection
agency’s involvement,172 and its second opinion (on remand from the
Supreme Court) summarized the facts of each case without
mentioning the child protection agency’s involvement.173 Indeed, it
appears, from the reported decisions, that the plaintiffs never
challenged the sharing of information with child protection authorities.
This entirely understandable litigation choice demonstrates how the
special needs test’s line around law enforcement searches has
hardened, shaping litigation to focus on that line.
Ferguson II is particularly important for three reasons. First, it
demonstrates how the special needs doctrine draws lines between law
enforcement and other severe consequences. If the hospital had
created a policy to turn positive drug tests over to child protection
authorities with the same chain-of-custody procedures and if the child
protection authorities removed the children, the doctrine, in its current
form, does not suggest a Fourth Amendment violation would have
occurred. Ferguson II thus highlights a core task for anyone seeking to
justify the special needs doctrine: explaining why an arrest is a more
severe consequence than losing one’s child immediately after birth or,
from the child’s perspective, being placed in state custody. Ferguson II
did not attempt this task.
168. Brief for Petitioners at 15, Ferguson II, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (No. 99-936),
available at http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Petitioners
%20Supreme%20Court%20Brief.pdf.
169. Ferguson v. City of Charleston (Ferguson III ) , 308 F.3d 380, 389 (4th Cir. 2002).
170. Id. at 388.
171. The district court’s jury instruction, for instance, included the statement, “But
what makes this case unusual and what brings it within the coverage of the Fourth

Amendment is the fact that you have law enforcement and medical service people acting
together.” Brief for Petitioners, supra note 168, at 5 (quoting the district court’s jury
instruction (emphasis added)); see also Ferguson III, 308 F.3d at 393 (summarizing the
district court’s decision as “reject[ing] the special needs theory” because of law enforcement
entanglement).
172. Ferguson v. City of Charleston (Ferguson I ) , 186 F.3d 469 (4th Cir. 1999).
173. Ferguson III, 308 F.3d at 390-93.
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Second, it clarified doctrinally that one should look to the
“primary” and “programmatic” purpose of a particular search.174 This
programmatic inquiry focuses on policies, not the subjective intent of
individuals involved in a particular search, and thus creates a legal
incentive to develop policies that avoid excessive entanglement
between a legitimate special need and law enforcement.175 The Court
identified a law enforcement policy that was not based on the details of
the actual search itself, which looked like any mundane hospital blood
draw or urine test. Rather, the purpose was evident in the use of the
fruits of that search, which the hospital promptly turned over to police,
and the reasonably expected consequences of that decision.176
Third, Ferguson II demonstrates the special needs test’s ability to
preserve important constitutional rights in the face of political
pressure. The hospital’s actions arose in a particular social and
political context: “[T]he problem of ‘crack babies’ was widely
perceived in the late 1980[s] as a national epidemic, prompting
considerable concern both in the medical community and among the
general populace.”177 The Court did not note that the most widespread
legal effect of society’s concern about women exposing developing
fetuses to crack cocaine was in child welfare. The foster care
population swelled as child protection agencies responded to increased
use of crack cocaine in those years. Removals of children born to
substance-abusing mothers formed a hugely disproportionate amount
of this increase; removals of infants increased 89% in New York and
58% in Illinois over three years, and most of those removals occurred
“within days following birth.”178 Subsequent longitudinal studies
express significant doubt regarding the wisdom of these removals.
Cocaine use during pregnancy is undeniably bad (although less severe
than feared in the 1980s and 1990s), with increased risks of attention
and self-regulation problems, but no significant effects on a child’s
174. Ferguson II, 532 U.S. 67, 81 (2001).
175. See infra notes 237-249 and accompanying text.
176. Ferguson II, 532 U.S. at 84-85. This feature of Ferguson II also evokes some of
the most powerful language of Boyd—the case relied upon in Frank and, by extension, in
Camara. See discussion supra notes 120-134. Boyd found a Fourth Amendment violation
even without authorities conducting a physical search: “It is not the breaking of his doors,
and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property
. . . .” 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
177. 532 U.S. at 70 n.1.
178. Eugene M. Lewit, Child Indicators: Children in Foster Care, 3 FUTURE OF
CHILDREN 192, 196-98 (1993), available at http://www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/
publications/docs/03_03_Indicators.pdf.
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physical growth, developmental test scores, or language outcomes.179
Moreover, rather than removing infants exposed to drugs in utero by
their mothers, at least one child protection system has placed such
cases on a differential response track, in which the family is not even
investigated nor generally subject to a finding of neglect that could
lead to a removal.180
Lidster is important for a different reason: it focuses on a law
enforcement consequence to the individual searched or seized, and
was thus relied upon by the state officials in Camreta.181 Lidster upheld
the use of a highway checkpoint with which police stopped cars at the
same location and time of day as a fatal hit-and-run that had occurred
several days prior. Police asked motorists if they had witnessed the
crime, but did not expect to stop the culprit. The police officers’ goal,
to catch a criminal distinct from the individuals seized at the
checkpoint, distinguished Lidster from a highway checkpoint designed
“to look for evidence of drug crimes committed by occupants of those
vehicles,” which the Court had ruled unconstitutional.182 Even the
Lidster dissent recognized the “valid and important distinction
between seizing a person to determine whether she has committed a
crime and seizing a person to ask whether she has any information
about an unknown person who committed a crime a week earlier.”183

179. These conclusions are from a 2010 review of multiple studies on the effect of in
utero cocaine exposure on children’s first six years of life. John P. Ackerman et al., A Review
of the Effects of Prenatal Cocaine Exposure Among School-Aged Children, 125 PEDIATRICS
554, 554 (2010), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/125/3/554.full.html;
see also Susan Okie, Encouraging New on [sic] Babies Born to Cocaine-Abusing Mothers,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/world/americas/27iht-coca.3.
19716510.html (summarizing recent research on the harm of in utero cocaine exposure and
the comparative harms of in utero alcohol and tobacco exposure).
180. CHILD & FAMILY SERVS., DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE: WORKING AS ONE TO KEEP
THE DISTRICT’S CHILDREN SAFE 14 (2011) (listing “newborn positive toxicology” as a
category of cases eligible for a “family assessment” rather than an investigation) (on file with
author).
181. Supra note 85 and accompanying text.
182. 540 U.S. 419, 423 (2004) (“The stop’s primary law enforcement purpose was not
to determine whether a vehicle’s occupants were committing a crime, but to ask vehicle
occupants, as members of the public, for their help in providing information about a crime in
all likelihood committed by others.”). The prior case was City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,
531 U.S. 32 (2000). Four highway checkpoint cases are discussed infra notes 222-224 and
accompanying text.
183. 540 U.S. at 428 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
John Paul Stevens dissented in part because he concluded that the search was unreasonable,
an analysis entered only after the Court applied the special needs doctrine. Id.
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The Lidster Court thus applied the special needs doctrine despite
an undisputed law enforcement purpose.184 The essential gloss is that
the special needs test looks for state action that identifies the individual
searched or seized as the target of a criminal investigation. This gloss
is not readily apparent in the special needs language from T.L.O. and
subsequent cases, but that may simply reflect the reality that in all of
those cases, the individual searched or seized was the individual who
bore the consequences (criminal or otherwise) of those searches and
seizures. Until Lidster, the Court did not have the opportunity or need
to decide how to apply the special needs test when the individual
searched or seized was not a criminal target.185

D.

Boundaries of the Special Needs Doctrine

Clearly defining what qualifies as a special needs case and what
qualifies as a case considering some other warrant and probable cause
exception is essential for various reasons. Mixing together different
categories of administrative search cases can lead not only to confused
analysis, but to the erosion of important Fourth Amendment
safeguards.186 It is thus important to treat searches that have a law
enforcement purpose regarding the individual searched, yet which do
not trigger the warrant and probable cause requirements, as something
other than a special needs search.187
Recent Supreme Court cases suggest clearer boundaries around
the special needs doctrine, by delineating other doctrines that exempt
certain state action from warrant and probable cause requirements and
184. Lidster did not use the phrase “special needs,” so one can question whether it is a
true special needs case. See infra Part III.D. But it relied heavily on Edmond. See Lidster,
540 U.S. at 423-24, 426-27 (citing Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35, 40-41, 44). Edmond was framed
as a special needs case that sought to discern the traffic stops’ “primary purpose.” 531 U.S. at
40, 44.
185. Primus has criticized Lidster for failing to discuss the level of executive discretion
at issue when the officials decided to set up the specific roadblock and selected the particular
time and location they did, thus failing to consider the core purpose of the warrant
requirement as identified in Camara. Primus, supra note 14, at 282. But if the Court is right
that seizures that are limited to eliciting witness statements do not significantly invade
privacy, at least when the seizure is brief and minimally invasive (as in Lidster), then checking
executive branch discretion is of much less importance; checking discretion to invade
individual privacy more significantly is a greater value.
186. See id. at 277-301 (arguing that conflation of dragnet and special subpopulation
cases has led to a weakening of protections in both categories).
187. See Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why Public Safety Is Not a Special
Need, 59 DUKE L.J. 843, 849 (2010) (describing law enforcement searches as those “that
cannot be justified by the special needs doctrine”). Simmons also persuasively argues why
suspicionless antiterrorism searches—like those at airports, public buildings, and
elsewhere—cannot be justified by a special needs analysis. Id. at 887-93.
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by analyzing searches with law enforcement purposes directed at the
individual searched under a reasonableness framework. The Court has
found a set of searches targeting individuals with such reduced
expectations of privacy that are permissible without a warrant or
probable cause. The most recent and most clearly articulated example
is Samson v. California, in which the Court upheld suspicionless and
warrantless searches and seizures of state parolees; the opinion makes
no effort to present the searches as justified by a special need beyond
law enforcement and did not pretend the searches served any purpose
other than ensuring criminal convicts had not slid into recidivism upon
their parole.188 Similarly, the Court in United States v. Knights upheld
a warrantless search of a probationer’s apartment, with explicit
consideration of the state’s “interest in apprehending violators of the
criminal law,” given the high recidivism rate of probationers.189
One can question the results and analysis in Samson and Knights,
but at least the Court did not push them into the boundaries of the
special needs doctrine, thus avoiding the intellectual contortions of
earlier cases.190 Two cases decided one week apart in 1987 confused
the line between special needs and reduced privacy cases. In Griffin v.
Wisconsin,191 from which Knights and Samson trace their lineage,192 the
188. 547 U.S. 843, 847, 855 n.4 (2006); see also id. at 858 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“Not surprisingly, the majority does not seek to justify the search of petitioner on ‘special
needs’ grounds.”).
189. 534 U.S. 112, 118, 121 (2001). One factual distinction may explain the
unanimity of the Knights Court: reasonable suspicion (but not probable cause) existed to
search Knights’ apartment. Id. at 116. The Samson dissenters focused on this difference:
they would have permitted the warrantless search in Knights on reasonable suspicion, but
prohibited the warrantless search in Samson because it lacked any individual suspicion.
Samson, 547 U.S. at 857 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The difference goes to a “reasonableness”
analysis—whether some individualized suspicion should be necessary to render the search
reasonable—which is a debate beyond the scope of this Article.
190. Many have questioned Samson and Knights. E.g., Robert Cacace, Samson v.
California: Tearing Down a Pillar of Fourth Amendment Protections, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 223 (2007); Primus, supra note 14, at 296-97, 308 (criticizing Samson for not applying
the special needs doctrine); Melanie D. Wilson, The Return of Reasonableness: Saving the
Fourth Amendment from the Supreme Court, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (2008) (criticizing
the Court’s Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” cases).
191. 483 U.S. 868 (1987). In his Ferguson II dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia cited
Griffin for the proposition that “the special-needs doctrine was developed, and is ordinarily
employed, precisely to enable searches by law enforcement officials who, of course,
ordinarily have a law enforcement objective.” 532 U.S. 67, 100 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The majority appropriately focused the special needs doctrine on law enforcement purposes
and entanglement. Id. at 79 n.15 (majority opinion).
192. Knights twice cited Griffin to support its reasonableness analysis. Knights, 534
U.S. at 117-20. Samson cited Griffin in support of its reasonableness analysis. Samson, 547
U.S. at 848-49, 854.
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Court upheld a warrantless search of a probationer’s home, holding
that probation presented a special need beyond normal law
enforcement.193
The majority weakly argued that supervision
(including warrantless searches) of probationers helped ensure their
reentry into society without harming society via recidivism.194 The
Court similarly squeezed a different type of search into the special
needs box in New York v. Burger, upholding a warrantless and
suspicionless search of an automobile junkyard.195 The “ultimate
purpose” of the search was, undeniably, to deter and catch criminal
behavior (specifically, the frequent use of automobile junkyards to
hide stolen cars and parts), yet the Court described it as another
situation of special need.196 Tellingly, the Court omitted the second half
of the special needs test: whether the special need was beyond that of
ordinary law enforcement.197 Some more recent lower court cases
addressing DNA testing of criminal convicts also reflect the weak
arguments that come from trying to squeeze searches designed to
gather evidence of crimes committed by the individuals searched into a
special needs analysis.198

E.

What Makes Law Enforcement Purposes So Important?

The presence of ordinary law enforcement needs defines the line
between special needs and other searches. But T.L.O. did not explain
what was so special about law enforcement purposes that they, but
nothing else, should be exempt from special needs treatment.199
Camara suggested, but did not support, such a distinction.200 A
justification for treating law enforcement, and only law enforcement,
differently remains necessary.
193. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874.
194. Id. at 875.
195. 482 U.S. 691 (1987). The bulk of Burger explained the Court’s ruling that the
search could occur because automobile junkyards were a “pervasively regulated industr[y],”
id. at 693, in which business owners’ reasonable expectation of privacy is reduced, id. at 70001.
196. Id. at 693, 702; see also id. at 708 (“[M]otor vehicle theft has increased in the
State and . . . the problem of theft is associated with this industry.”). Schulhofer aptly
explained this flaw in Burger. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 103.
197. I do not suggest that Burger is unimportant to the special needs doctrine. Once
the Court applied the special needs doctrine to Burger—however flawed that decision may
have been—the Court embarked on an important discussion of when an administrative
scheme can adequately cabin officials’ discretion and replace a warrant procedure. Infra
notes 233-235 and accompanying text.
198. Infra notes 231-232 and accompanying text.
199. Supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text.
200. See cases cited supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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Later Supreme Court cases have briefly discussed factors that
might explain what makes law enforcement searches so different. But
none are satisfying.201 First, O’Connor noted that supervisors in
government agencies should focus on running an efficient government
office and, unlike police officers, should not “learn the subtleties of the
probable cause standard.”202 Indeed, many state actors have far less
interaction with the justice system than police officers and, one may
argue, should not face the same restrictions on their behavior.203 One
circuit court evoked this concern when, citing O’Connor, it wrote:
If forcing a non law-enforcement government officer to follow ordinary
law-enforcement requirements under the Fourth Amendment would
impose intolerable burdens on the officer or the courts, would prevent
the officer from taking necessary action, or tend to render such action
ineffective, the government officer may be . . . subjected to less
stringent reasonableness requirements instead [of probable cause and
204
warrant requirements].

This concern does not recognize that many state actors, such as child
protection officials, are, like police officers, frequently involved in
court or other legal proceedings and can be fairly expected to
understand legal concepts. And any state official implementing a
regulatory scheme should understand the legal issues that arise in the
course of that implementation. Moreover, the O’Connor argument
does not justify what the T.L.O. test did in that case: impose a
reasonable suspicion standard on school searches, which still requires
teachers and administrators to understand the subtleties of a Fourth
Amendment concept.
Second, Justice Lewis Franklin Powell’s T.L.O. concurrence
suggests that law enforcement officials have an inherently
“adversarial” relationship with criminal suspects, unlike the
relationship school officials have with students.205 That distinction may
have surprised T.L.O., who would likely have characterized her
relationship with the assistant principal who searched her purse and
201. Cf. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 114 (“Unfortunately, Justice Blackmun’s
concurrence and the Court opinions based on it never attempt to justify the permissive side of
his test. . . . And [later cases] cited his formulation as one already accepted and in no need of
defense.”).
202. 480 U.S. 709, 724-25 (1987).
203. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 353 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(noting that teachers should not be expected to determine the existence of probable cause
quickly).
204. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 603 (2d Cir. 1999).
205. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 349-50 (Powell, J., concurring).
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turned her over to the police as adversarial.206 The point is even weaker
when applied to child protection searches. Just as police “have the
responsibility to investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those
who violate our laws, and to facilitate the charging and bringing of
such persons to trial,”207 child protection investigators have the
responsibility to investigate child abuse and neglect, locate abusive and
neglectful parents, remove abused and neglected children from those
parents, and facilitate legal proceedings to effectuate such removals.
Child protection investigations are inherently adversarial to parents and
to children who do not want protection from the state.208
Third, the Court has suggested that the probable cause
requirement is “rooted . . . in the criminal investigatory context.”209 But
the authorities relied on for this assertion focus less on anything unique
to criminal investigations and more on the distinction between
individualized investigations and “routine administrative caretaking
functions,”210 a reference that evokes standardized, discretionless

206. The Ninth Circuit similarly described the relationship between network
administrators and network users as nonadversarial. United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d
1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 349-50 (Powell, J., concurring)). But,
as in T.L.O., the facts seem adversarial: a network administrator played a cat-and-mouse
game with a hacker and, upon identifying the suspect, searched his computer to determine if
he had hacked into the university’s server and committed a federal crime. Id. at 1143-45.
207. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 349.
208. In the federal government’s terms, investigations have an “adversarial
orientation.” CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DIFFERENTIAL
RESPONSE TO REPORTS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 6 (2008), available at http://www.
childwelfare.gov/pubs/issue_briefs/differential_response/differential_response.pdf; see also
HARVEY SCHWEITZER & JUDITH LARSEN, FOSTER CARE LAW: A PRIMER 65 (2005) (stating
that child protection investigation “is most often adversarial rather than cooperative”). The
issue of a child who wishes to speak with authorities is discussed infra notes 344-345 and
accompanying text.
209. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989); O’Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987).
210. Both O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 723, and Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667, cite Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987), which, in turn, relies on a footnote in South Dakota v.
Opperman. Opperman states: “The standard of probable cause is peculiarly related to
criminal investigations, not routine, noncriminal procedures. . . . The probable-cause
approach is unhelpful when analysis centers upon the reasonableness of routine
administrative caretaking functions, particularly when no claim is made that the protective
procedures are a subterfuge for criminal investigations.” 428 U.S. 364, 370 n.5 (1976)
(citation omitted). Bertine, like Opperman, involved a police inventory search of automobiles
(searches governed by a separate category of Fourth Amendment law) that provided no
occasion to address a nonroutine, noninventory search or seizure implicating an important
constitutional right other than the various rights associated with criminal procedure. Bertine,
479 U.S. at 369. Bertine also cited a footnote in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977), that is even less relevant to the special needs doctrine. Bertine, 476 U.S. at 371
(citing Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 10 n.5). The Chadwick footnote simply notes the Opperman
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searches like those at border checkpoints or airports and says nothing
about “noncriminal” investigations, which are anything but routine and
which implicate important constitutional rights. The Court might have
cited Cady v. Dombrowski, which recognized a “community
caretaking” exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements,
when a search or seizure is “totally divorced from the detection,
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a
criminal statute.”211 Cady’s language is roughly analogous to the
special needs doctrine.212 But Cady, too, offers little explanation,
offering no citation for its “totally divorced” language.213 In context,
Cady’s language merely explains that local law enforcement officers
have frequent contact with automobiles for a variety of noncriminal
purposes: enforcement of traffic, parking, and vehicle safety laws.
Cady does not explain why a bright line exists between criminal and
noncriminal purposes.214 Then again, like early special needs cases,
Cady did not deal with noncriminal searches or seizures that implicate
important constitutional rights.
Fourth, Justice Stephen Breyer suggested in Lidster that searches
or seizures that place the individual searched or seized at risk of arrest
and prosecution are particularly likely “to provoke anxiety or to prove
intrusive.”215 Justice Breyer distinguished highway checkpoints designed
to identify, stop, and punish criminal drug activity from “informationseeking” stops designed to ask the public for “help in providing
information about a crime in all likelihood committed by others.”216
On one hand, Justice Breyer’s focus on the likely consequence to the
individual searched or seized is an essential element of a more
analytically sound special needs doctrine, as argued in Part IV.B. But
holding regarding police inventory searches and states “the salutary functions of a warrant
simply have no application in that context.” Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 10 n.5.
211. 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
212. For a comparison of the community caretaking and special needs doctrines, see
Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Police Paternalism: Community Caretaking, Assistance Searches,
and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1519-27 (2009). In
addition, Opperman—the ultimate source of the Court’s assertion that the warrant
requirement is “rooted” in criminal investigations—cited Cady multiple times. 428 U.S. at
367, 368, 369 n.4, 374-76, 376 n.10 (citing Cady, 413 U.S. 433). Opperman particularly
focused on Cady’s description of “noncriminal in nature” contact between police and
individuals. Id. at 368.
213. 413 U.S. at 441.
214. Justice William Brennan made this point in his Cady dissent, arguing that the
Fourth Amendment applies both when an individual is a criminal suspect and when they are
not. Id. at 453-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
215. 540 U.S. 419, 425 (2004).
216. Id. at 423-24.
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on the other hand, this focus says nothing about why law enforcement
searches, in particular, should be treated differently. In Camreta, a
seizure “provoke[d] anxiety” and “prove[d] intrusive” because of the
civil consequences to a child’s home life (she was removed from her
parents’ custody for several weeks) rather than because of any criminal
consequence to the child.217
In sum, in the twenty-seven years since T.L.O. and the forty-five
years since Camara, the Supreme Court has offered no sufficient
explanation of what makes law enforcement purposes or entanglement
so important that it distinguishes special needs searches and seizures
from those that will trigger the warrant and probable cause
requirements. As Akhil Amar wrote, the Supreme Court’s criminal
versus other searches distinction provides “no answer.”218

F.

Concluding Synthesis

The special needs doctrine is now a well-established element of
Fourth Amendment law, directing courts and litigants to analyze
whether a particular search falls on the law enforcement or non-lawenforcement side of the doctrine’s bright line. Despite its frequent
application, the doctrine remains without any adequate justification for
drawing this bright line where it does. In addition, since T.L.O., it has
lost its focus on the reasons noted in Camara and other cases for why
the warrant requirement exists (cabining executive branch officials’
discretion). As discussed in Part II, these faults are on vivid display in
Camreta and other child protection cases, which involve state action
which implicates civil, but fundamental, rights and which involves
significant discretion.
The doctrine’s evolution, however, contains two themes that are
highly relevant to a reformed and more coherent doctrine for the
future. First, the special needs doctrine focuses on the intended and
reasonably foreseen consequences to the individual searched or seized;
those consequences are a primary mechanism for determining on
which side of the doctrine’s bright line a particular case falls. Second,
the doctrine now focuses on the programmatic or policy purpose of a
search or seizure, suggesting a focus on how the doctrine can shape
governments’ policy choices.
217. Id. at 425; supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
218. Amar, supra note 116, at 770 (“The unsupported idea that the ‘core’ of the
[Fourth] Amendment is somehow uniquely or specially concerned with criminal law is
simply an unfortunate artifact . . . .”).
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IV. TOWARD AN IMPROVED SPECIAL NEEDS TEST
The Supreme Court should reform the existing special needs
binary to protect individuals from warrantless searches and seizures
that implicate fundamental constitutional rights. The current doctrine’s
valuation of law enforcement purposes above all others has never been
adequately justified. The test’s application to child protection searches
and seizures illustrates its limitations and lack of theoretical
grounding. This Part will outline steps toward an improved special
needs test. It will first describe the values embedded in the Court’s
formulation. It will then describe how a reformed test that better
accounts for those values can lead to better results and sounder
analysis.

A. Special Needs Test’s Value
One can reasonably question whether the Supreme Court ought
to jettison the special needs test entirely: after all, the Fourth
Amendment’s text says nothing about the particular type of search nor
suggests in any way that a search by a police officer ought to be treated
differently than a search by a social worker or health inspector.219 I do
not share this view. The special needs test has the potential to allow
the Fourth Amendment to regulate meaningfully and rationally the
wide variety of searches and seizures performed by the modern
administrative state and the different privacy interests those actions
involve. The test reflects three important values.
First, drawing a bright line recognizes that many administrative
searches involve minimal privacy intrusions while providing important
social benefits and permits those to occur without allowing them to
serve as cover for more invasive government action. Camara dealt
with a housing code search, and the Court acknowledged the
“vigorous” case “that the health and safety of entire urban populations
is dependent upon enforcement of minimum fire, housing, and
sanitation standards, and that the only effective means of enforcing
such codes is by routine systematized inspection of all physical
structures.”220 Modern constitutional law respects this role of
219. See id. at 758 (describing as false Fourth Amendment case law’s distinction
between criminal and civil purposes because the Amendment’s text “applies equally to civil
and criminal law enforcement” and “[i]ts history is not uniquely bound up with criminal
law”).
220. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967). An earlier case, not decided on
constitutional grounds, addressed health department inspections. District of Columbia v.
Little, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
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government, and the special needs doctrine protects that role from
overly burdensome Fourth Amendment regulation. Accordingly,
Camara acknowledged that the warrant requirement may be
inappropriate if “the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate
the governmental purpose behind the search,” a theme reiterated by the
Supreme Court and lower courts.221
Conversely, the special needs test also provides a mechanism to
ferret out administrative searches used as subterfuge for criminal
investigations, and the Supreme Court’s record shows the promise of
enforcing a line between true special needs and something else.
Ferguson II aptly demonstrates the Court’s ability to enforce the line.
But it is not the only case. In a series of highway checkpoint cases, the
Court has distinguished between those with a primary purpose of
“general . . . crime control” and those focusing on “roadway safety.”222
A highway checkpoint with the “primary purpose of interdicting
illegal narcotics” does not qualify for the special needs doctrine,223
while a “sobriety checkpoint” to take drunk drivers off the road, and
thus prevent accidents in the immediate future, does.224 In analogous
areas, state courts have distinguished between police who entered a
home to determine if unconscious individuals had overdosed on drugs
and needed medical attention from police who seized a teenager in no

221. Camara, 387 U.S. at 533; see also, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 721
(1987); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 316 (1978) (discussing a potential warrant
requirement’s burden on the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s entire regulatory scheme);
Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 603 (2d Cir. 1999) (“If forcing a non law-enforcement
government officer to follow ordinary law-enforcement requirements under the Fourth
Amendment would impose intolerable burdens on the officer or the courts, would prevent the
officer from taking necessary action, or tend to render such action ineffective, the government
officer may be relieved of those requirements and subjected to less stringent reasonableness
requirements instead.”).
222. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979).
223. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000).
224. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990). Sitz is not directly
framed as a special needs decision. In response to plaintiffs’ argument that there was no
special need beyond law enforcement because drunk drivers were not only taken off of the
road but arrested and charged with driving under the influence, the Court said that a separate
body of “prior cases dealing with police stops of motorists on public highways” governed,
and that those cases permitted a balancing test. Id. at 450. That statement was somewhat odd
since Justice Blackmun had cited some of those highway stop cases in his T.L.O. special
needs opinion. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 352 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. BirgnoniPonce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)). Regardless, the result is the same as it would have been if the
Court had explicitly found a special need. (The Court went on to apply a balancing test to
determine if the stops were reasonable).
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obvious distress whom they suspected of drug involvement.225 One
need not agree with the precise lines courts have drawn (for instance,
one can question whether a sobriety checkpoint designed both to take
drunk drivers off the road and to arrest and charge them with driving
under the influence ought to qualify for the special needs doctrine) to
recognize that the line exists and thereby provides some meaningful
protection of Fourth Amendment interests.
I acknowledge that the Court’s record in policing against
subterfuge is imperfect. Justice Blackmun, the original author of the
special needs test, was rightly criticized in Burger for applying a
special needs framework to a search designed to determine if a
vehicle-dismantling business possessed stolen property.226 Other courts
have engaged in some intellectual contortions to fit a particular search
on the special needs, and not ordinary law enforcement, side of the
line. For instance, a Ninth Circuit panel held that the search of a
computer that was suspected to have been the source of recent and
potentially ongoing hacking into a public university’s network was
justified by the special needs doctrine.227 The search was done in
consultation with police officers to protect the university’s server and
network from the effects of a federal crime (recklessly causing damage
by intentionally accessing a protected computer without
authorization).228 Distinguishing a search conducted in consultation
with law enforcement to prevent or interrupt an ongoing crime from a
search for ordinary law enforcement purposes is far too fine a
distinction.
Courts’ difficulty in enforcing the line between true special needs
cases and law enforcement searches and seizures arises with greater
frequency when courts do not respect the boundaries of the special
needs doctrine discussed above.229 That was the case in Burger, which
was largely decided based on the reduced expectation of privacy held
225. Compare State v. Pinkard, 785 N.W.2d 592 (Wis. 2010) (finding that officers
were engaged in a community-care function because they had received a tip about someone
sleeping next to drugs, arrived to find the front door open, and knocked and received no
response before entering), with State v. Kinzy, 5 P.3d 668 (Wash. 2000) (en banc) (finding
that officers were reasonable in approaching a small, teenage girl in a high-narcotics area to
determine whether she was at risk but had no right to seize her when she tried to walk away).
226. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 724 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Whether
Justice Blackmun’s point that a “closely regulated” business had a reduced expectation of
privacy justifying a warrantless search is valid, apart from his misapplication of his own
special needs framework, is a point beyond the scope of this Article. Id. at 613-14.
227. United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007).
228. Id. at 1144-46 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)).
229. Supra Part III.D.
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by a “closely regulated” business.230 Lower court cases showing
difficulty policing the special needs line similarly confuse reduced
privacy cases with special needs cases. One Ninth Circuit judge,
echoing several circuit courts, has written that extracting DNA from
convicted criminals counts as a special need when done to aid the
offender’s “rehabilitation through deterrence,” even if that action will,
“of course[,] aid in catching him” if said rehabilitation fails.231 A later
Ninth Circuit opinion held that taking a convict’s DNA for purposes of
including it in a “cold case file” renders the special needs doctrine
inapplicable.232 This distinction only teaches law enforcement officials
to assert a goal of “rehabilitation through deterrence” rather than
catching repeat offenders. It would be more appropriate to determine
whether the fact of a criminal conviction so reduces the individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy that extracting their DNA does not
violate their Fourth Amendment rights.
Second, a test designed to permit the administrative state to
function helpfully focuses Fourth Amendment doctrine on the
machinery of the administrative state and incentivizes legislative and
regulatory standards to protect individual privacy. Thus, in Burger,
Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court that to justify an exception to the
warrant requirement, a regulatory scheme must adequately substitute a
warrant by giving notice that particular searches are lawful, with a
delineation of the search’s scope that limits the discretion of state
officials performing such searches.233 Again, the potential for poor
application of this regulatory and legislative focus lies in the fact that
Burger itself exemplifies how the Supreme Court’s examination of a
regulatory regime’s adequacy can be “flaccid.”234 But Burger’s
discussion of how a detailed regulatory regime can provide the same
value that a warrant provides is an important element of explaining the
value of the special needs test, which also permits replacement of a
230. 482 U.S. 691, 693 (1987); see supra note 195 and accompanying text.
231. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 841 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J.,
concurring). Various state and federal courts have upheld mandatory DNA testing of convicts
under a special needs analysis. Id. at 830-31 (majority opinion) (collecting cases); see also
Sandra J. Carnahan, The Supreme Court’s Primary Purpose Test: A Roadblock to the
National Law Enforcement DNA Database, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1, 19-28 (2004) (arguing that
special needs justify DNA databases).
232. Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2009).
233. 482 U.S. 691, 703 (1987). Whether Justice Blackmun’s analysis lived up to that
standard in Burger is another matter. Primus argues it failed to do so. Primus, supra note 14,
at 283-84.
234. See Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 98; see also id. at 102-03 (describing the
relatively minimal limits imposed by the regulatory scheme at issue).
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warrant requirement with an administrative scheme. It also creates
incentives for legislatures and agencies to more specifically delineate
procedures for special needs searches and seizures to increase the
likelihood of deference to challenged searches and seizures,235 and thus
to impose some modest limits on official discretion to balance
administrative search regimes with individual privacy and reduce the
wide variations in responses to similar facts.236
Third, through its focus on “programmatic purpose”237 (rather
than individual officials’ subjective intent), the special needs doctrine
creates an incentive for policy makers to limit the most invasive form
of state intervention. Commentators have recognized how the special
needs test encourages state and local governments to “develop more
effective, flexible approaches” to various social problems “without
imposing the often ignored costs of enlarging the scope of criminal
liability.”238 The school setting at issue in T.L.O. provides the most-apt
examples of the special needs doctrine’s incentive structure. T.L.O.
and its progeny encouraged school districts that are developing drug
testing policies to draw bright lines in those policies (the districts
whose drug test policies were upheld in Vernonia School District 47J
v. Acton and Board of Education v. Earls decided, by policy, to neither
threaten to, nor actually, turn over drug test results to the juvenile
justice system and instead offered those students assistance and lesssevere, non-law-enforcement punitive consequences). Whatever the
pedagogic or disciplinary benefits of those drug tests, the special needs
test helps limit those policies to school issues and avoid more-severe
consequences.239
T.L.O. has been less successful at limiting the severity of state
intervention following school disciplinary incidents. School districts
and law enforcement agencies have grown closer to a point that the
mainstream media has prominently explored—how fourth graders’
school-yard offenses can become law enforcement and courtroom
matters—and the United States Attorney General and United States
Amar, supra note 116, at 816-17.
Amsterdam, supra note 135, at 416-19.
Ferguson II, 532 U.S. 67, 81 (2001).
Alafair S. Burke, Unpacking New Policing: Confessions of a Former
Neighborhood District Attorney, 78 WASH. L. REV. 985, 1062-63 (2003).
239. For example, Justice Ginsburg challenged the reasonableness of a policy that
required of drug testing all students engaged in extracurricular activities, which was upheld in
Earls, for irrationally “steering students at greatest risk for substance abuse away from
extracurricular involvement that potentially may palliate drug problems.” Bd. of Educ. v.
Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 853 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
235.
236.
237.
238.
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Secretary of Education have called for such practices “to stop.”240 This
problem results from an inability to enforce T.L.O.’s rule.
Summarizing school search cases, the Illinois Supreme Court has
observed that the decisive variable tends to be the level of involvement
of law enforcement officers in particular searches.241 While police
involvement in a particular search certainly is relevant, overemphasizing this point violates Ferguson II ’s instruction to focus on the
programmatic purpose of many of these searches. That purpose is
increasingly to identify evidence to turn over to law enforcement, a
trend which should lead (but has not yet led) courts to enforce more
seriously the special needs test in school contexts. Schools would have
authority to maintain safety and discipline, but should be prevented
from routinely and programmatically turning school-yard offenses into
criminal cases, a key element of the school-to-prison pipeline.242
Schools should be forced to choose between using the informal
procedures permitted by T.L.O. for school disciplinary consequences
only or the more formal warrant and probable cause procedures if they
turn students over to law enforcement.
Child protection investigations could provide another example of
the programmatic purpose test’s value if the special needs doctrine
focused on serious non-law-enforcement consequences. Requiring
probable cause and a warrant before seizing children for interviews or
inspecting homes would impose an administrative burden on state
child protection officials.243 That burden creates an important and
valuable incentive for those officials to find some alternative means to
achieve their goals without triggering those Fourth Amendment
240. Donna St. George, Texas Students Sent from Classroom to Courtroom, WASH.
POST (Aug. 21, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/in-texas-schools-acriminal-response-to-misbehavior/2011/08/04/gIQA5EG9UJ_story.html (summarizing the
conviction of a Houston-area fourth grader for fighting on a school bus and reporting on
statements of United States Attorney General Eric Holder and United States Department of
Education Secretary Arne Duncan).
241. People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 317 (Ill. 1996); see also Feld, supra note 162,
at 889 (“Courts’ assessments of the proper standard—reasonable suspicion or probable
cause—to search often hinge on whether a school official or a police officer initiated it.”).
242. Kagan, supra note 148, at 310-12.
243. An administrative burden must be distinguished from a burden that would prevent
the government from achieving its purpose in child protection investigations. The defendants
in Camreta argued that the latter was the case, an argument which requires establishing that
obtaining a warrant would prevent the government from adequately investigating alleged
abuse. Brief for Petitioner at 43-46, Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (Nos. 091478 and 09-1454), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/
preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10_09_1478_PetitionerJamesAlford.authcheckda
m.pdf. That point was contested by S.G. Brief for Respondents, supra note 50, at 53.
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protections. As discussed above, the majority of child protection
investigations involve relatively low-risk allegations, and the vast
majority do not lead to removals,244 leading some child protection
systems to develop differential response systems.245 These systems ask
families who are the subject of low-risk allegations to participate in
voluntary “family assessments” to determine which, if any, services
would help the family and help keep the children safe. Such families
generally would not be subject to substantiation for abuse or neglect or
removal of children.246 Crucially, the core, fundamental right of family
integrity would not be at stake with such assessments; thus, the special
needs doctrine would apply. Investigative resources, including those
necessary to seek warrants and document probable cause, would focus
on higher-risk cases. Some jurisdictions now assign up to 70% of
abuse and neglect allegations to family assessment tracks,247 something
that more meaningful Fourth Amendment protections could make the
norm.
Incentivizing family assessment tracks will reduce invasions of
children’s and families’ privacy and likely serve children’s interests
more effectively than the status quo of investigating all children who
are the subject of child protection hotline reports. One of the
remarkable features of the status quo is how little good is done when
child protection authorities investigate families for suspected abuse or
neglect but do not remove children.248 A longitudinal study of children
who had been the subjects of a child maltreatment investigation found
that these children, as compared to children with similar family
problems but no child protection contact, had no perceptible
differences in social support, family functioning, or child behavior
problems.249 The bottom line, as the study’s title states, is that these
investigations were “A Missed Opportunity for Prevention”
244. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
246. A child protection agency might still choose to investigate a family assigned to an
assessment track. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 4-1301.04(c)(3) (2012). States’ experience with
differential response suggest that such decisions are made rarely. See, e.g., VA. DEP’T OF SOC.
SERVS., EVALUATION OF THE DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE SYSTEM 12 (2008), available at http://
www.dss.virginia.gov/files/about/reports/children/cps/all_other/2008/differentialresponsesyst
em_evaluation_annualreport_2008_12-08.pdf (reporting that only 2% of families referred to
an assessment track were subsequently referred for an investigation).
247. VA. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., supra note 246, at 5.
248. I do not advocate removing these children. Rather, I advocate for more-effective
interventions to resolve serious problems without traumatizing children via removal.
249. Kristine A. Campbell et al., Household, Family, and Child Risk Factors After an
Investigation for Suspected Child Maltreatment: A Missed Opportunity for Prevention, 164
ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 943, 943 (2010).
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(specifically, to provide proven services).250 The study’s findings were
so dramatic that the medical journal that published the study
simultaneously published an editorial radically asserting that “Child
Protective Services has outlived its usefulness” and recommending
that the better response to allegations of neglect is to provide various
service interventions rather than formal investigations.251
These incentive benefits are less powerful under an older
proposal to reform the special needs doctrine. In 1989, Stephen
Schulhofer proposed drawing a bright line between state action to exert
“social control” over “private activity” and “searches in aid of the
internal governance objectives of public enterprises” (such as school
discipline), with any search or seizure serving internal governance
subject only to a reasonableness analysis.252 This approach would
create incentives to avoid social control and thus maximize liberty, an
important benefit.253 But once a search or seizure qualifies as an
internal governance action, the Fourth Amendment incentive for the
state to limit the extent to which an action invades individual liberty
would disappear. The potential to incentivize less-liberty-infringing
responses to school disciplinary incidents, which Schulhofer
categorizes as internal governance issues,254 would be lost.

B.

Reasonably Foreseeable Consequences to Fundamental
Constitutional Rights, Not Just Law Enforcement Purposes

The first and most important reform to the special needs test
should be to broaden its focus beyond the existence or absence of law
enforcement purposes and to focus instead on the reasonably
foreseeable consequences of a challenged search or seizure on
fundamental constitutional rights. Fundamental constitutional rights
250. Id.
251. Abraham B. Bergman, Child Protective Services Has Outlived Its Usefulness,
164 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 978, 978-79 (2010).
252. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 118.
253. As Schulhofer acknowledges, the terms “social control” and “internal
governance” do not have crystal-clear boundaries. Id. at 116. It is likely that there would be
significant overlap between his approach and mine, as many (if not most) searches and
seizures that affect fundamental constitutional rights would also work to achieve some form
of social control. The primary, principled difference between his approach and mine is that a
test focusing on the constitutional rights that are implicated by a search or seizure more
directly invites analysis of such actions in their full constitutional context. Infra notes 284293 and accompanying text. In practice, we differ in our approaches to school search cases,
which Schulhofer categorizes as internal governance actions, Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 118,
but which I contend often implicate fundamental constitutional rights.
254. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 118.
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include all those either deemed “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty” and thus incorporated against the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment255 or, like the right to family integrity, deemed to be a
fundamental right provided by another amendment.256 A focus on
criminal consequences is already present, even if the Supreme Court
has not adopted that language. Limiting that focus to criminal
consequences cannot be justified, and the doctrine must be reformed to
account for constitutional consequences beyond those of the criminal
justice system. If the purpose of the search or seizure makes it
reasonably likely or foreseeable that a consequence significantly
implicating a constitutional right beyond the Fourth Amendment, the
special needs doctrine should not apply.
1.

Focus on Consequences Explains Results in Special Needs Cases

Focusing on the presence or absence of intended or reasonably
foreseen criminal consequences best explains the results of special
needs cases.257 The intended criminal consequences explain the
decisions against those searches and seizures in Camara, City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, and Ferguson II, and the absence of such
consequences explains the decisions in Acton, Earls, Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives Ass’n, National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab, O’Connor, and Quon. T.L.O. may be explained by the
lack of an intended law enforcement consequence at the initiation of
the search, when the assistant principal thought he was searching for
cigarettes (and not marijuana), and may be criticized for ignoring the
(presumably intended) law enforcement consequence that followed.258
Lidster may be explained by the absence of expected or intended
criminal consequences to the individuals stopped. Given the
“notoriously unclear” state of this particular doctrine,259 a focus on
reasonably foreseen consequences does not explain every case,
especially Burger and Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz.
But, as argued above, the Court did not properly conceive of Burger as
a special needs case (even if that misconception led to an important
255. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
256. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
257. The risk that officials may unexpectedly find some evidence of a crime and turn
that evidence over to the police does not make the discovery reasonably foreseeable. For
instance, the seizure in Lidster led to the discovery of admissible evidence of and prosecution
for drunk driving. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 422 (2004).
258. Supra notes 146-148 and accompanying text.
259. Primus, supra note 14, at 257.
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discussion of administrative substitutes for a warrant procedure),260 and
the Court drew a flawed line in Sitz.261
Indeed, the Court’s first major administrative search case,
Camara, struck down a scheme that imposed criminal sanctions on
individuals who refused to consent to a particular search.262 Camara
also framed its discussion of law enforcement purposes in terms of
consequences to the individual searched: the home search minimally
invaded privacy because the search was not “aimed at the discovery of
evidence of crime,” implying that the intended or reasonably expected
consequences relate to the level of privacy invaded.263 Schulhofer
offered a similar analysis of Camara, writing that the Court must have
“meant to stress not [law enforcement] motivation but [law
enforcement] effects.”264
The Court reinforced the conclusion that consequences matter to
the administrative search analysis just four years later in Wyman v.
James.265 The Court upheld a state law requiring individuals to consent
to home visits as a condition of receiving welfare benefits. Barbara
James refused to give such consent, but the only consequence was her
loss of welfare benefits.266 No criminal consequence followed, and
because individuals lack a constitutional entitlement to welfare
benefits, “nothing of constitutional magnitude [was] involved.”267 A
similar statement could be made regarding later cases upholding
searches and seizures under the special needs doctrine: where all that
is at issue is public employment (O’Connor and Quon), railway and
sensitive employment positions (Skinner and Von Raab), or
extracurricular school activities (Acton and Earls), no constitutional
rights are involved, and criminal prosecution is neither likely nor
intended.

260. Supra notes 195-197 and accompanying text.
261. Supra note 224 and accompanying text.
262. 387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967). Summarizing the case, the Court wrote: “[A]ppellant
has been charged with a crime for his refusal to permit housing inspectors to enter his
leasehold without a warrant. . . . [W]e therefore conclude that . . . appellant may not
constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection.” Id. (emphasis added).
263. Id. at 537.
264. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 93.
265. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
266. Id. at 317-18 (“We note, too, that the visitation in itself is not forced or compelled,
and that the beneficiary’s denial of permission is not a criminal act. If consent to the
visitation is withheld, no visitation takes place. The aid then never begins or merely ceases,
as the case may be. There is no entry of the home and there is no search.”).
267. Id. at 324.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
misread Wyman and other special needs cases as holding that
“investigative home visits by social workers are not subject to the same
scrutiny as searches in the criminal context,” even when the search at
issue is by a child protection social worker.268 This superficial analogy
(it was a social worker in Wyman, and it is a social worker in a child
protection case) ignores the different implications of the two social
workers’ visits. In Wyman, the social worker could take away
something to which the individual had no constitutional right. In the
child protection context, the social worker could take away a parent’s
and child’s right to family integrity, something with the utmost
constitutional protection. The Fourth Circuit’s superficial analogy is
understandable given the special needs doctrine’s binary, but it is no
less wrong.
The consequences of a search were again decisive in Ferguson II.
The search itself, in which blood was drawn routinely from pregnant
women admitted to the hospital by medical personnel without the
presence of police, did not raise constitutional concerns. Only the
subsequent reporting of positive drug test results to law enforcement,
and the resulting criminal prosecutions, made the hospital’s actions
unconstitutional.269 This is Ferguson II ’s key lesson: a search’s consequences, not its circumstances, matter most. One might argue that law
enforcement purposes deserve special treatment because police
officers’ orders to submit to a search or seizure impose extra anxiety
on individuals. Indeed, it would surely unsettle a woman in labor or
immediately postpartum to be interrupted in her hospital room by a
uniformed and armed police officer insisting that she take a drug test.
Precisely because that did not happen in Ferguson II, that case stands
for the proposition that something else (namely, the consequences of a
search or seizure) determines the side of the special needs binary on
which the search or seizure falls.
Ferguson II reached this conclusion through explicit references to
the constitutional rights at stake when law enforcement became
involved, stating that the intention to “incriminat[e]” patients triggers
constitutional protections for criminal suspects.270 Child welfare cases
also trigger a set of constitutional protections identified by the

268. Wildauer v. Frederick County, 993 F.2d 369, 372 (4th Cir. 1993).
269. Supra notes 165-180 and accompanying text.
270. Ferguson II, 532 U.S. 67, 85 (2001) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966)).
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Supreme Court: a hearing on a parent’s fitness,271 an elevated burden
of proof if the case reaches the termination-of-parental-rights stage,272
and any other protection required by procedural due process. These
cases also trigger a set of statutory provisions designed to protect
children’s and parents’ right to family integrity and to codify their
procedural due process rights (such as a right to counsel,273 a right to an
agency’s “reasonable efforts” to prevent removal of a child from a
parent,274 and a right to regular judicial reviews of ongoing foster
care275).
Less dramatically, the Supreme Court focused on the
consequences to individuals who are searched and seized in Lidster,
which approved of a highway checkpoint that sought information from
the public about a hit-and-run on the roadway the previous week, and
which led to police arresting a drunk driver.276 The checkpoint had an
undeniable law enforcement purpose: to obtain evidence leading to an
arrest in the hit-and-run. But the consequence of that purpose was not
directed at the individuals stopped at the checkpoint who, “in all
likelihood,” would not include the culprit.277 In another checkpoint
case, a search was ruled unconstitutional when the checkpoint’s
purpose was “to determine whether a vehicle’s occupants were
committing a crime,” that is, when the expected consequences of the
seizure were directed at the individuals seized.278

271. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).
272. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982). Multiple states also apply a
heightened burden of proof to an initial adjudication of abuse or neglect. E.g., In re G.S., 630
S.E.2d 607, 610 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006); Adoption of Mary, 610 N.E.2d 898, 902 (Mass. 1993);
In re D.D.H., 875 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
273. A large majority of states provide parents with a right to counsel throughout a
child abuse or neglect case. Vivek Sankaran, A National Survey on a Parent’s Right to
Counsel in Termination of Parental Rights and Dependency Cases, UNIV. MICH. L. SCH.
CHILD ADVOCACY CLINIC, http://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/ccl/specialprojects/
Documents/National Survey on a Parent’s Right to Counsel.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
Describing children’s right to counsel is more difficult because some states provide a right to
an attorney who will represent the child’s views and others provide a right to an attorney who
will represent what they believe to be in the child’s best interest. Regardless, the vast majority
of states provide some kind of legal representation to children in child abuse and neglect
cases. JEAN KOH PETERS, U.S. JURISDICTION SUMMARY CHART (2006), http://www.law.yale.
edu/rcw/rcw/us_summary_chart.ppt.
274. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)(i) (2006).
275. Id. § 675(5)(C).
276. 540 U.S. 419, 425 (2004).
277. Id. at 423.
278. Id. (citing City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000)) (distinguishing
Edmond ’s general crime-control checkpoint from Lidster ’s information-seeking checkpoint).
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This focus on consequences also helps respond to one critique of
the special needs doctrine. Ric Simmons accuses the Court of
“weakening . . . the ‘noncriminal purpose’ requirement” in the special
needs cases that followed T.L.O.279 While T.L.O. asserted a clear nonlaw-enforcement purpose (maintaining school discipline), Simmons
argues that the later cases approving suspicionless drug testing of
students were “barely distinguishable from a standard law enforcement
purpose: ‘[d]eterring drug use by our Nation’s schoolchildren.’”280
This riddle is solvable if we look past the stated special need and
analyze the intended and foreseeable consequences of the search.
Drugs’ illegality does not mean that concern about drug use
necessarily has a criminal purpose or consequence. Explicitly refusing
to turn over evidence of drug use to law enforcement and instead
requiring that students engage in drug treatment places a search on the
noncriminal side of the line. Conversely, T.L.O. wrongly approved a
criminal consequence (turning over the evidence found in the search to
police, leading to prosecution of T.L.O. as a delinquent) without
considering whether the search had a purpose or reasonable
expectation of imposing such a consequence.281 That criticism stands
despite the more clearly noncriminal purpose articulated in that case.282
2.

Analyzing the Constitutional, Not Just Criminal, Consequences
of a Search or Seizure

The special needs doctrine usefully focuses on consequences.
But its limited focus on criminal consequences is unjustified.283 A
better approach is to reform the doctrine to focus on important
constitutional consequences. If a search or seizure is reasonably likely

279. Simmons, supra note 187, at 863.
280. Id. at 865 (alteration in original) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646, 661 (1995)).
281. Supra note 148 and accompanying text.
282. A focus on consequences, and, specifically, the absence of criminal consequences, also explains the results in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656 (1989), and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)
(upholding suspicionless drug testing of certain public employees). Paralleling his criticism
of the school drug testing cases, Simmons criticizes these cases as involving searches whose
purpose “was essentially to deter illegal activity (drug use), with the dubious argument that
deterring illegal activity went beyond the standard goals of law enforcement because of the
highly dangerous or sensitive positions that the employees occupied.” Simmons, supra note
187, at 868. The holding is less dubious when one considers the absence of any criminal
consequences imposed on employees whose drug tests show evidence of illegal conduct. Id.
283. Supra Part III.E.
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to threaten another constitutional right, it should not satisfy the special
needs doctrine.
Significant Supreme Court precedent exists for weighing other
constitutional consequences similarly. Those consequences form the
constitutional context for any specific search or seizure; they
determine whether anything of “constitutional magnitude is
involved.”284 And context matters to the Fourth Amendment analysis.
As the Court wrote in Safford, “Changing for gym is getting ready for
play; exposing for a search is responding to an accusation reserved for
suspected wrongdoers and fairly understood as . . . degrading . . . .”285
That is, one cannot determine how invasive particular conduct is by
looking at the precise, physical actions involved (in Safford, a teenager
undressing) in isolation from its context.
My approach would place the Fourth Amendment special needs
doctrine within the constitutional context of specific searches and
seizures. Though a novel idea for the special needs doctrine, it is
hardly novel for other constitutional rights or for the Fourth
Amendment. In the Supreme Court’s procedural due process
jurisprudence, the greater the importance of the private interest
affected, the greater the process required to affect that interest.286 Not
coincidentally, modern procedural due process law, like the special
needs doctrine, developed in response to the modern administrative
state and the need to develop legal tests that recognized the different
impacts of different types of government action. Similarly, when a
search or seizure implicates a private interest of a constitutional
dimension, that fact should be an essential element of the search’s
context.
The Court has also explicitly integrated First and Fifth
Amendment values into the Fourth Amendment. A proposed search
and seizure of items with First Amendment protections (a reporter’s
notebook or a mosque’s building) calls for applying the Fourth
Amendment with “scrupulous exactitude.”287 The Court has integrated
284. Supra note 267 and accompanying text.
285. 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642 (2009).
286. Mathews v. Eldridge built this principle into its procedural due process test,
requiring analysis of “the private interest that will be affected by the official action” as the
first element of the three-part procedural due process test. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). A
commentator has recognized that the Mathews test “calls for more formal procedures where
more grievous deprivations are threatened.” Amy Sinden, “Why Won’t Mom Cooperate?”: A
Critique of Informality in Child Welfare Proceedings, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339, 373
(1999).
287. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965). Justice William Douglas made a
similar point in his Frank v. Maryland dissent, connecting the First, Fourth, and Fifth
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Fifth Amendment self-incrimination values into the Fourth
Amendment. Boyd, the nineteenth-century case indirectly relied upon
in Camara, explicitly connected the Fifth Amendment implications of
the document seizure at issue to the Court’s holding that the seizure
violated the Fourth Amendment.288 Though the Court may not have
applied this principle scrupulously in all cases,289 it stands for the
proposition that people have a greater expectation of privacy when
other fundamental constitutional rights are at stake.290 Similarly, in
applying the community caretaking doctrine (itself somewhat
analogous to the special needs doctrine), the Washington Supreme
Court has explicitly weighed individuals’ constitutional rights beyond
the Fourth Amendment, including the freedoms of association and
expression.291
The lesson, as Akhil Amar put it, is that we should look to the
entire Constitution “to identify constitutional values that are elements
of constitutional reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment.292
Amendments as “safeguarding not only privacy and protection against self-incrimination but
‘conscience and human dignity and freedom of expression as well.’” 359 U.S. 360, 376
(1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 445
(1956)). Justice Douglas’s dissenting view became the majority view when Camara
overturned Frank. A First Amendment concern can also be raised in child protection
investigations. E.g., In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 3652 (Ct. App.
May 22, 2008).
288. Supra note 133 and accompanying text.
289. Amar has criticized the Court for its handling of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
U.S. 547 (1978), for failing to apply the Stanford principle faithfully. Amar, supra note 116,
at 805-06.
290. Avoiding law enforcement consequences by imposing First Amendment
consequences should not resolve special needs doctrine. Alafair S. Burke hypothesized civil
seizures of noisemaking devices as an attractive alternative to criminal sanctions of
noisemakers, and a positive illustration of the policy incentives served by the special needs
test’s focus on law enforcement purposes. Burke, supra note 238, at 1031. Civil seizure may
indeed be preferable to criminal sanctions, but that fact alone should not place the proposed
seizures under a relaxed Fourth Amendment framework, because such seizures could directly
affect First Amendment rights. (If the particular devices lack significant First Amendment
protection, it is a different matter.)
291. State v. Kinzy, 5 P.3d 668, 679 (Wash. 2000) (en banc).
292. Amar says to examine the Bill of Rights, in which he includes the Fourteenth
Amendment. Amar, supra note 116, at 805 & n.170. For clarity of application, I would
examine all substantive constitutional rights deemed fundamental—either deemed “implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty” and thus incorporated against the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), or deemed to be a fundamental
right under another amendment, Amar, supra note 116, at 805. See Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57, 65 (2000). As the phrase “constitutional reasonableness” suggests, Amar calls for a
review of the reasonableness of most searches and seizures, rather than a warrant and
probable cause approach—this is an approach I do not share. His separate insight that Fourth
Amendment analysis must incorporate other constitutional concerns directly applies to my
approach.
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That a search or seizure, as in Camreta, affects a fundamental
constitutional right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment must be
considered in evaluating the action’s constitutionality. The failure of
the present special needs doctrine is that it avoids such an evaluation
by focusing entirely on the presence or extent of a law enforcement
purpose. Schulhofer’s line between social control and internal
governance searches and seizures would be a dramatic improvement
over the status quo, but that line less precisely directs consideration of
other constitutional values, unlike a test focused on whether a search or
seizure implicates constitutional rights.293
Of course, delineating fundamental constitutional rights is no
obvious task. I would include all substantive rights that spring from
the Constitution itself, most of which are found in the Bill of Rights or
later amendments (especially the Fourteenth Amendment). As an
illustration, one can distinguish searches and seizures of public school
students, which threaten juvenile justice or child protection
consequences, from searches and seizures implicating school
disciplinary actions, like short suspensions. The former implicates
rights substantively created by the Constitution294 while the latter
implicates rights created by state law, which only trigger modest
procedural constitutional protections.295 A more difficult case might
involve more severe disciplinary consequences like expulsion.296
Litigation would necessarily focus on which reasonably foreseeable
consequences of various searches and seizures trigger constitutional
protections, a task entirely in line with the special needs doctrine’s
focus on consequences and a contextual, constitutional understanding
of the Fourth Amendment.
More generally, this contextual analysis flows from Fourth
Amendment principles that animate the seminal case of Katz v. United
States and its discussion of what creates a “reasonable expectation of
privacy” that the Fourth Amendment will protect.297 Justice John
Harlan’s concurrence explained that the Fourth Amendment protects
293. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 116.
294. See generally Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (recognizing a right to
family integrity); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (recognizing a right to juvenile justice).
295. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572 (1975). In addition, state constitutions do
provide a substantive right to an education. See Josh Kagan, Note, A Civics Action:
Interpreting “Adequacy” in State Constitutions’ Education Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241
(2003) (discussing state constitutional provisions). A state constitutional analog to the Fourth
Amendment, therefore, might lead to a different result than a federal constitutional analysis.
296. Goss, 419 U.S. at 584.
297. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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an expectation of privacy “that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”298 Justice Harlan later expounded, “This question must
. . . be answered by assessing the nature of a particular practice and the
likely extent of its impact on the individual’s sense of security balanced
against the utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement.”299
If an action “significantly jeopardize[s] the sense of security which is
the paramount concern of Fourth Amendment liberties,” then it
deserves significant Fourth Amendment protection.300
Applying these lessons to child protection investigations
powerfully illustrates why constitutional rights beyond those accorded
to criminal suspects must be included. Child protection searches
directly affect Fourteenth Amendment rights. They threaten to support
state action to take custody of a child away from a parent, which is the
most fundamental interference with a parent’s constitutional right to
“care, custody, and control” of their child and to the child’s right to
remain with the parent.301 Indeed, in Camreta, the child suffered
precisely that kind of “uncertainty and dislocation” when placed in
foster care for three weeks as a result of her allegedly coerced
statements.302 It should be plain that this type of action can shake an
individual’s “sense of security.”
Even when a child protection investigation does not lead to the
removal of a child from their family, it affects Fourteenth Amendment
rights. The Constitution gives parents immense authority: the right to
be a “despot,” likely benevolent, over their children.303 The seizure of
children to discuss allegations of abuse or neglect is itself a sharp limit
of this parental authority. Indeed, that limitation is the entire point:
state officials seek to isolate children from their parents to discuss, free
of parental influence, whether the parents have provided adequate
care.304 Searches of the family home and compelled interviews of
298. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
299. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
300. Id.
301. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). The Court has expressed its concern
that unnecessary intervention in family life will cause children to “suffer from uncertainty
and dislocation.” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972). Circuit courts have
consistently found that children have a right to family integrity. E.g., Wallis ex rel. Wallis v.
Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000); Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 599 (D.C.
Cir. 1983).
302. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 647.
303. Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 675-76 (2006).
304. The Camreta defendants acknowledged this point. Supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
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everyone in the home necessarily imply a limit to the parents’ authority
over their home, the physical location where a parent’s constitutional
rights are at their highest and unmediated by school or other authority
figures.
Child development theory, on which the Supreme Court has
relied in other cases involving children’s constitutional rights,305 is
consistent with constitutional protections against such interventions
into the parent-child relationship. Doriane Lambelet Coleman has
summarized the scientific evidence that children have a sense of
privacy and bodily integrity from very young ages, a sense which
searches and seizures may violate—and those violations “cause real
emotional and psychological harm.”306 In their seminal work on state
intervention in children’s lives, Joseph Goldstein and his coauthors
wrote:
Any invasion of family privacy alters the relationships between family
members and undermines the effectiveness of parental authority.
Children, on their part, react with anxiety even to temporary
infringements of parental autonomy. The younger the child and the
greater her own helplessness and dependence, the stronger is her need
to experience her parents as her law-givers—safe, reliable, all-powerful,
and independent. Therefore, no state intrusion ought to be authorized
307
unless probable and sufficient cause has been established . . . .

Goldstein and his coauthors thus suggest a dramatic break from
current child protection practices. Child protection authorities impose
similar “temporary infringements of parental authority” in response to
virtually any allegation of abuse or neglect.308 Goldstein and his
coauthors would replace that current regime with one requiring that
some standard be met before such invasive, investigatory steps could
occur. The authors do not describe the legal mechanism they would
use, but the phrase “probable and sufficient cause” suggests Fourth
Amendment procedures.309
Child protection cases also illustrate why the special needs
doctrine ought not elevate criminal consequences over all other
consequences because they show that criminal consequences are not
inherently more severe than others. To maintain the current special
305. E.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026-27 (2010) (citing Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005)).
306. Coleman, supra note 11, at 515-16, 520-21.
307. Goldstein et al., supra note 106, at 97.
308. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
309. Goldstein et al., supra note 106, at 97.
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needs doctrine, one must accept that it is worse to be placed in prison
for a short period of time than to lose your children or, from the child’s
perspective, to be taken from your parents and placed with strangers.
As Amy Sinden has convincingly written:
Considering the fear and trauma that removal can invoke in a child, it
seems reasonable to suppose that many parents, if given the choice,
would rather themselves spend several days in prison, than see their
child taken away from all people and things familiar to spend even a
310
few nights with well-meaning strangers in foster care.

The Supreme Court has occasionally suggested that it views the
fundamental substantive due process right of family integrity and the
right to liberty, at stake in a criminal case, as similarly serious.311 The
most detailed discussion came in Santosky v. Kramer, which addressed
the burden of proof borne by the state in a termination-of-parentalrights case.312 Having decided that a preponderance of the evidence
burden gave insufficient deference to the fundamental constitutional
rights at stake, the Court addressed whether a beyond a reasonable
doubt burden, with analogies to criminal cases, was needed, or whether
a clear and convincing burden would suffice.313 The Court chose the
latter because termination-of-parental-rights cases often involved
psychiatric evidence on issues “difficult to prove to a level of absolute
certainty.”314 This explanation does not suggest that the rights at stake
in a termination case are less than the rights at stake in a criminal trial.
Rather, it suggests that the type of facts that need to be proven
(whether a child is “permanently neglected”315 in the former, compared
with whether a defendant committed specific acts in the latter)
necessitates a partially elevated burden. By declining to hold that the
interests at stake in child welfare cases are categorically less important
310. Sinden, supra note 286, at 360-61. Sinden gives a fuller critique of the too-oftenassumed primacy of loss of physical liberty over other forms of liberty. Id. at 358-68; see
also DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 17 (2002)
(“Removing children from their homes is perhaps the most severe government intrusion into
the lives of citizens.”).
311. At least one state court has equated the Fourth Amendment rights of children in
child protection cases to adults accused of crimes, while ruling that a requested sex abuse
exam of a teenage girl was unnecessary when conclusive proof of such abuse already existed.
In re Shernise C., 934 N.Y.S.2d 171 (App. Div. 2011) (“An innocent child should certainly
have as much right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure as someone suspected
of committing a crime.”).
312. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
313. Id. at 768.
314. Id. at 769.
315. Id. at 747.
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than those in criminal cases, Santosky evoked the dissenting opinions
written the prior term in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, in
which the Court held by a five-to-four vote that parents do not have a
constitutional right to counsel in termination-of-parental-rights
proceedings.316 One Justice wrote that “there can be few losses more
grievous than the abrogation of parental rights.”317 Another went
further: “Although both deprivations [a prison sentence and
termination of parental rights] are serious, often the deprivation of
parental rights will be the more grievous of the two. The plain
language of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that both
deprivations must be accompanied by due process of law.”318
Such statements are not limited to family integrity cases. The
Court recently noted that the nominally civil sanction of deportation is
“sometimes the most important part” of consequences that flow from a
criminal conviction.319 That is, core criminal sanctions (a prison
sentence, a fine, the public stigma associated with a criminal
conviction) may all impose a less grievous harm to many individuals
than a sanction imposed by the civil immigration law.
Still, the law generally prioritizes criminal consequences over
civil ones, even those that implicate fundamental rights and severely
limit liberty. An earlier burden of proof case highlighted how the
beyond a reasonable doubt burden serves to bolster the “moral force of
the criminal law” and thus is unlikely applicable to civil actions, even
those leading to severe liberty infringements.320 The moral force of
criminal law also reflects the social stigma that accompanies a
conviction.321 It is therefore unsurprising that at least one commentator
has suggested that the special needs doctrine serves to distinguish
“morally stigmatizing” government goals from less stigmatizing
316. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
317. Id. at 40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
318. Id. at 59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
319. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010). Padilla noted that deportation
is “not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction,” but emphasized the “close connection” between
the criminal and civil bodies of law. Id. at 1481-82.
320. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 364 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Like Santosky, Addington also focused
on other differences between criminal cases and the problem at issue—civil commitment of
the mentally ill. “The subtleties and nuances” of mental health conditions and diagnoses
threatened to make the beyond a reasonable doubt burden insurmountable in any case. Id. at
430. Which dicta in Santosky and Addington are most important cannot be definitively
determined from the text of the opinions themselves.
321. Merely describing conduct as criminal—even if prosecution cannot or does not
occur—creates a stigma worthy of the Supreme Court’s attention. See Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
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ones.322 Put another way, criminal investigations can “damage
reputation or manifest official suspicion,”323 and impose a “targeting
harm” distinct from the harm to one’s privacy caused by a particular
search or seizure.324
But even this morally stigmatizing force does not justify drawing
a line around criminal consequences. For instance, the stigma attached
to drunk driving (at least, when it does not lead to harmful accidents)
is less than that attributed to drug use.325 Yet searches aimed at
identifying the latter can be distinguished from criminal enforcement
purposes (as Von Raab, Skinner, Acton, and Earls make clear) while
the seizures aimed at the former (in Sitz ) lead to criminal
consequences. Ferguson II provides an even more powerful example
by illustrating the tremendous stigma applied to maternal drug use,
especially among poor, African-American women.326
One can broaden the point: society holds somewhat stereotypical
and idealized views of parenthood, especially motherhood, and
concomitantly places a tremendous stigma on bad parents, especially
bad mothers.327 The stigma is both gendered and racial; our country’s
long and troubled racial history “has long stereotyped poor Black
women . . . as incompetent, uncaring, and even pathological
mothers.”328 Beyond legal literature, other writers have identified the
powerful social meaning attached to judgments of one’s quality as a
mother, and how deeply rooted such judgments are in American
history and society.329 It should be apparent that this social stigma has
nothing to do with whether evidence of maternal drug use supports a
criminal charge against the mother, a civil action to remove a child
322. Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Fourth Amendment?: Consent, Care, Privacy, and
Social Meaning in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 30
(2002).
323. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 116; see also Debra Livingston, Police, Community
Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 274.
324. Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1486-87 (1996).
325. Taslitz, supra note 322, at 67-72.
326. Id. at 76-77.
327. See Marie Ashe, “Bad Mothers,” “Good Lawyers,” and “Legal Ethics,” 82 GEO.
L.J. 2533, 2547 (1993) (describing the “gendered focus of child dependency law” as
imposing a “stigma of ‘badness’” on women).
328. ROBERTS, supra note 310, at 28.
329. See generally “BAD” MOTHERS: THE POLITICS OF BLAME IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA (Molly Ladd-Taylor & Lauri Umansky eds., 1998) (discussing the social impacts of
mother-blaming theories). For a more recent and mass-marketed topic on similar themes, see
AYELET WALDMAN, BAD MOTHER: A CHRONICLE OF MATERNAL CRIMES, MINOR CALAMITIES,
AND OCCASIONAL MOMENTS OF GRACE (2009).
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from that mother’s custody, or both. Any use of such evidence would
impose a severe stigma. That is particularly so when such evidence is
used to establish that mothers are unfit parents, as occurs in child
protection cases (that is, to target individuals for a formal, adverse, and
stigmatizing judgment). And when authorities place children in foster
care, the stigma passes down by a generation.330
Finally, lower federal court child protection cases aptly illustrate
why the special needs doctrine should focus on important
constitutional consequences of searches and seizures because federal
appellate courts have already begun linking Fourteenth Amendment
analyses to Fourth Amendment analyses. These cases arise when
parents and children challenge what they allege to be an unnecessary
and unconstitutional removal of the child by child protection
authorities. Parent and child plaintiffs typically allege that the
challenged removal violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to
family integrity and the child’s Fourth Amendment protections against
unreasonable seizures. In Tenenbaum v. Williams, the Second Circuit
addressed a Fourteenth and Fourth Amendment challenge to the state’s
removal of a child and subsequent medical examination of her.331 After
discussing, but not deciding, whether the special needs doctrine
applied, the Second Circuit stated, “Whatever Fourth Amendment
analysis is employed, then, it results in a test for present purposes
similar to the procedural due-process standard.”332 That test raised a
colorable claim of unconstitutional removal and thus demanded a
ruling in favor of the parents and child. At least two other circuits have
held similarly.333
The connection drawn, in Tenenbaum and similar cases, between
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments is particularly clear in cases
that challenge the removal of a child as a violation of both
Amendments. A removal involves physically taking custody of a child
and is thus undeniably a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. A
removal directly infringes on a parent’s due process right to care,
330. E.g., ALEX HALEY & MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X, at 21
(Grove Press 31st ed. 1992) (1964) (describing the stigma of being a “state child”).
331. 193 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999).
332. Id. at 605.
333. Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 428-29 (5th
Cir. 2008); Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1242 (10th Cir. 2003) (“The action challenged
in this case involved not only a warrantless search, but also the removal of a child from his
parents[, which implicates] the interest of the parents in keeping the family together.” (citing
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)); Wallis ex rel. Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d
1126, 1137 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he same legal standard applies in evaluating Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment claims for the removal of children [as applies to parents’ claims].”).
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custody, and control, which the Supreme Court has held may generally
not occur without a hearing on the parent’s fitness.334 A less clear
connection exists to a CPS investigation like the seizure at issue in
Camreta, which involved state action that intervened in family
integrity to a lesser degree immediately and only threatens a future
removal. But the fundamental point that the Fourteenth Amendment
rights at stake affect the Fourth Amendment analysis applies in full
force.

C.

Refocus on the Warrant Requirement’s Purpose

The special needs doctrine asks when government officials
should be able to avoid the burden of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
clause. Focusing instead on the existence of a law enforcement
purpose distracts from the ultimate purpose of the test. Burger
suggests a useful line of analysis for cases involving special needs
searches.335 When administrative standards advise individuals that a
search or seizure is legal, has a defined scope, and limits the discretion
of government officials, then a warrant is less likely to add value.336
On the other hand, when the decision to search or seize, or the decision
regarding scope and methods to be used, involves discretion or does
not follow clear limits, then a detached and neutral magistrate provides
essential protections.
Child protection again demonstrates how the special needs
doctrine’s focus on law enforcement purposes prevents it from
fulfilling its goal of determining when a warrant is required. Child
protection investigations have substantial, case-by-case variation
necessitating significant executive discretion regarding when and how
to perform an investigation. These investigations are inherently
adversarial,337 creating an “often competitive enterprise” in which child
protection investigators try to ferret out evidence of abuse or neglect.338
Even with some regulatory guidance, these investigations call out for a
check on state officials’ discretion. And the regulatory guidance that
does exist can be violated, as the Camreta facts (leading questions
asked in violation of state guidance for interviewing children) reveal.339
334. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).
335. As argued supra notes 195-196 and accompanying text, Burger incorrectly held
that the search at issue served special needs rather than law enforcement purposes.
336. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703 (1987).
337. Supra note 208 and accompanying text.
338. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
339. Oregon guidelines caution against “asking numerous leading questions” and
“making coercive statements” because they will lead to “a higher possibility that some
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Yet, unless the special needs doctrine can consider purposes beyond
law enforcement, it will likely permit an unjustified exception to the
warrant requirement for child protection searches and seizures, and fail
even to consider violations of government guidelines for child
protection investigations. Just as Burger required an administrative
scheme to limit discretion in a business regulation case, at the very
least the special needs doctrine should inquire whether a warrant is
necessary in order to check executive branch discretion in child
protection investigations.

D.

Applying a Reformed Special Needs Test in Child Protection
Cases

Applying a reformed special needs test can lead to a clearer and
more analytically sound resolution of Fourth Amendment questions in
child protection cases. The first and most important point in the
analysis is that the foreseeable consequence of child protection
searches and seizures—removal of children from their parents and
placement in state custody—is severe and of immense constitutional
magnitude to both parents and children. It directly implicates
fundamental constitutional rights of such a pedigree that they trigger
many procedural protections. This point values not only severe civil
consequences similarly to criminal consequences, but it values the
impact of this governmental action on children (who experience only
the civil consequences) as highly as it values the impact on parents
(who may experience both civil and criminal consequences). This
point is true regardless of the involvement of law enforcement or the
presence of an allegation of physical or sexual abuse that would be
relatively likely to trigger law enforcement involvement.340

children will make false accusations.” BOHANNAN ET AL., supra note 80, at 28. In Camreta,
the social worker repeatedly made coercive statements: In response to S.G.’s denial of any
abuse by her father, “He would say, ‘No, that’s not it,’ and then ask me the same question
again. For over an hour, Bob Camreta kept asking me the same questions, just in different
ways, trying to get me to change my answers.” Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th
Cir. 2009), vacated in part, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
340. The majority of administrative findings of child maltreatment are for neglect, not
physical or sexual abuse. Supra note 33 and accompanying text. Likewise, state-specific
data shows that a similar proportion of removals result from neglect and not physical or
sexual abuse. E.g., CHILD & FAMILY SERVS. AGENCY, DIST. OF COLUMBIA, ANNUAL REPORT
FY 2010, at 23 (2011) (listing “neglect” as the primary reason in 531 of 809 removals, with
physical and sexual abuse accounting for only 202; the remainder falling into categories
accurately counted as neglect and not abuse, like a parent’s drug abuse, incarceration, or
“caretaker ill or unable to cope”).
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Secondly, child protection searches involve significant discretion.
Although every allegation, no matter how severe or how credible, must
be investigated, and every investigation must include certain steps,
essential details remain within individual caseworkers’ discretion:
when to search a home or seize a child; whether to request consent
before such steps; how to interview a potential victim, perpetrator, or
witness; and whether a physical exam is needed and, if so, who should
perform it.341 These decisions follow a subjective and case-specific
evaluation of evidence.
Under this analysis, Camreta becomes fairly easy.342 The seizure
at issue implicated fundamental constitutional rights and led state
officials to remove S.G. from her family for three weeks. The time,
place, and manner of the seizure were discretionary. Camreta and
Alford chose when to seize and interview S.G. (several days after
receiving the allegation, without performing much background
investigation, and without requesting consent from either of S.G.’s
parents), chose where to do it (at school, to best isolate S.G. from her
parents), and chose how to do so (with a series of leading and highpressure questions). Moreover, the interview’s details illustrate the
problems that arise when child protection authorities exercise
unchecked discretion.
A ruling that child protection searches and seizures should
require probable cause would a have significant benefits, as suggested
throughout this Article. States would have incentives to limit the
number of investigations triggering such severe consequences to
children through mechanisms like differential response. States would
also face incentives to individualize investigations to a greater extent,
considering an allegation’s severity and its credibility. The answer to
341. Supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. Court procedures can direct child
protection agencies to use forensic interviewers, rather than less-well-trained investigators.
For instance, the Indiana Court of Appeals upheld a court order that directed the interview of
a child at a local child advocacy center. In re G.W., No. 07A01-1201-JM-6, slip op. at 10-11
(Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2012), available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/pdf/1010
1203tac.pdf. The case arose under a statutory provision empowering child protection
authorities to seek a court order for a parent “to make the child available to be interviewed,”
IND. CODE § 31-33-8-7(d) (2012), when “good cause” exists, id. § 31-33-8-7(c).
342. Camreta would also be fairly easy under Schulhofer’s test, discussed supra notes
252-253 and accompanying text. A child protection investigation does not serve the “internal
governance objectives” of a public school. Rather, it balances “the individual interest in the
security of private activity”—from a parent’s perspective, to raise one’s children as one sees
fit, and, from a child’s, to live with one’s family—and “the public interest in effective social
control,” which is prevention of child abuse or neglect and protection of children from such
maltreatment; thus, Schulhofer would require a warrant and probable cause. Schulhofer,
supra note 4, at 118.
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every allegation need not be an invasive search of a home and
nonconsensual interviews of children. Incredible allegations, or
allegations that appear motivated by personal quarrels among adults,
need not trigger such invasions (and could not, under a ruling outlined
above).343
We can imagine two twists of the facts in Camreta. First, assume
that a child protection investigator visits a school to speak with school
staff. A teacher takes the child to the investigator, who explains their
job. The child responds, “Can I tell you about what my dad does to me
when he drinks?” and the investigator then takes the child to the
multidisciplinary center for an interview. If a child voluntarily speaks
with state officials, then there should be no Fourth Amendment
problem.344 Although they may not understand the consequences of
disclosing abuse to child protection officials, the child appears to
consent willingly to an interview of reasonable duration. And if
children can voluntarily speak to police when they themselves face law
enforcement consequences, it stands to reason that they can also speak
to child protection officials when they may face child protection
consequences. Because a voluntary conversation is permitted, some
very limited contact with children to determine if they will voluntarily
talk with investigators should be permitted, but with close scrutiny of
the voluntariness of a child’s response.345
Second, assume that, following a detailed investigative regimen, a
child protection investigator determines that there is reasonable
suspicion that a father molested his daughter. Following administrative
protocol, he performs as much investigation as possible without
revealing the existence of an investigation to the child or her parents by
speaking with school staff and others familiar with the family. He then
seeks the mother’s consent to take the child to a multidisciplinary
center to be interviewed about the alleged abuse by a trained forensic
interviewer. This would be the only investigatory interview of the
child and it would be recorded in its entirety. The mother refuses to
consent, denying any abuse. The investigator then brings the child to
the center for an interview and invites the parent to attend. This twist
343. Cf. supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
344. Justice Sonia Sotomayor suggested this point in the Camreta oral arguments,
suggesting that if S.G. had told Camreta, “I wish somebody had asked me before[;] I’m so
afraid of my daddy,” then a seizure surely would be acceptable. Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 94, at 37-38.
345. The Supreme Court recently held that a child’s age is a relevant factor in
determining whether they were in custody for purposes of obtaining Miranda warnings.
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
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supposes more effective administrative limits on official discretion.
The interview itself would be more rigorous and effective than the
interview actually performed in Camreta. The interviewer would
follow more-certain protocols; each interview would necessarily
follow its own course, but the methods used would be more
standardized than under a regime that permitted each individual
investigator to interview children when and how they saw fit.
Although a closer case than Camreta, I would not apply the special
needs doctrine and would require a warrant and probable cause before
such a seizure could take place because the immediate and potential
consequence to the child is so severe, and, separately, the remaining
discretion to the state official is so great, especially the discretion to
determine when evidence established that a forensic interview was
necessary, that these protections are essential. It must be noted that
this result would not necessarily prevent the interview from occurring;
probable cause may well exist and indicate that a multidisciplinary
center interview would reveal evidence of child abuse.
V.

CONCLUSION

I ended the previous section with a reevaluation of the Camreta
facts. The questions asked in evaluating those facts, whether the
seizure at issue implicated a fundamental constitutional right and
whether the seizure followed an administrative protocol that
adequately limited state actors’ discretion, are more relevant to
evaluating a search and seizure than, as the present special needs
doctrine requires, simply asking if a law enforcement purpose exists.
Reforming the special needs doctrine to focus on its core purposes
(protecting individuals when the consequences to them are
constitutionally significant and incentivizing all levels of government
to avoid the harshest consequences and to use democratic processes to
develop meaningful limits on executive discretion) will lead to more
logical legal rules and more effective protections for core Fourth
Amendment values.

